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RECENT FACTUAL DEVELOPMENTS 
a. Since appellant ("Sine") filed his opening brief, 
supersedeas surety and now co-debtor Jerry Sine died. 
b. Cottonwood has continued attempts to collect the 
judgment. Cottonwood has held a trustee's sale on Sine's 
personal residence, bidding in about $132,000, over and above a 
$14,000 homestead exemption. This bid exceeds the amount of the 
judgment held by Cottonwood ($98,706.20), more than retiring the 
debt. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Cottonwood has offered no convincing argument as to why 
attorney fees were proper without discovery or proper evidence. 
The trial court has broad discretion, but must base any award on 
the evidence before it. In this case, where the fees far 
exceed the judgment, there should have been findings based on 
the appropriate factors. 
The attorney fees should have stopped accruing when Sine 
vacated the premises, according to both the lease and this 
Court's prior decision in this case. Cottonwood Mall Co. v. 
Sine, 767 P.2d 499 (Utah 1988). 
ARGUMENT 
1. Cottonwood had the burden of proof* Yet it complains 
that Sine has offered "no evidence in the record" to support the 
argument that an evidenciary hearing should have been allowed 
on the reasonableness of attorney fees (a procedural/ not 
factual question). Br. p. 5. However Cottonwood, the party 
seeking relief in the form of a judgment for attorney feesf has 
the burden of proving the attorney fees are reasonable. The 
Cottonwood affidavit/ unencumbered as it is by detail/ is not 
enough to withstand even the most muffled objection. 
2. The court's discretion is not limitless. Cottonwood 
tries to get the Court to uphold the attorney fee award by 
citing to various cases which grant the trial court wide 
discretion as to the amount of attorney fees. Those authorities 
are not controlling heref where the court would not allow 
discovery or require evidence on the issue at all. Discretion 
as to amount is an entirely separate question from the issue of 
whether any record or findings support the award. 
One case Cottonwood relies upon for its argument that the 
court has broad discretion in considering attorney fee requests 
is Regional Sales Agencyf Inc. v. Reichert/ 784 P.2d 1210 (Utah 
App. 1989) {copy attached in Appendix}. In that case an 
attorney fee affidavit was submitted which was not objected tof 
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and which contained considerably more detail than Cottonwood's 
in this case. The court observed/ "An award of attorney fees 
must be based on evidence in the record which supports the 
award." 784 P.2d at 1215. 
Even when an attorney fee affidavit is uncontroverted by 
contrary testimonyf a trial judge "is not compelled to accept 
the self-serving testimony of a party requesting attorney fees." 
Id.; see alsof Beckstrom v. Beckstromy 578 P.2d 520, 524 (Utah 
1978) {". . . the trial judge was not necessarily compelled to 
accept such self-interested testimony whole cloth . . ."}. 
Rather, a judge "can evaluate the fees requested and 
[then] determine a lesser amount is reasonable under the 
circumstances." Regional Sales Agency, supraf at 1215 (copy 
attached in Appendix}. Here such evaluation was impossible. 
Since no evidenciary hearing or discovery was permitted/ all the 
evidence was in the exclusive control of Cottonwood and its 
counsel. That evidence was shared with the court only 
summarily. 
3. The court did not consider the common law factors. 
Cottonwood correctly points out that the attorney fee award 
should result from examination of several factors. Response Br. 
pp. 6-7. They include: 
a. Difficulty of litigation/ 
b. Efficiency of the attorneys/ 
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c* Reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the 
casef 
d. The fee customarily charged in the area for similar 
servicesf 
e. The amount involved in the case and the result 
obtained/ 
f. The expertise and experience of the attorneys 
involved. 
Regional Sales Agency v. Reichert/ 784 P.2d 1210 (Utah App. 
1989) (see Appendix}. There is no indication in the record that 
the trial court considered these factors/ despite the fact 
Cottonwood has the burden of proof. Yetf ironically/ Cottonwood 
complains that there is no evidence on which to base a 
determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion. 
Br. 6. 
Cottonwood's affidavit makes noreal effort to address the 
above six factors. R. 1788-90/ Opening Br. App. D. Instead/ 
Cottonwood makes the following amazing statement: "There is no 
evidence that these factors were not considered by Judge 
Frederick in his determination that the amounts claimed by the 
Cottonwood Mall Company were reasonable." Response Br. p. 7. 
Attorney fee awards must be properly substantiated. Seef 
Bangerter v. Poulton/ 663 P.2d 101f 103 (Utah 1983). This must 
be accomplished on the record/ not in a response brief. 
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Counsel's affidavit essentially is a statement that a 
review of the records (most of which were not provided to the 
trial court) "indicates" that the amount of fees claimed is 
actually due. R. 1788-90. There is no attempt to claim that 
the amount claimed is reasonablef or to inform the court of the 
number of hours spent. Id. Cottonwood all but admits the 
affidavit is inadequate: 
The individual statements were not attached to the 
Affidavit of counsel due to their volume and the 
expense involved in copying each individual 
statement for the seven years that the case had 
been pending. While it is true that the ledger 
cards did not reflect the specific services 
provided, the individual itemized statements for 
each of those charges were available should the 
trial court have desired to inspect them. 
Response Br. p. 6 (emphasis added). 
"It follows, therefore, that an award made without 
adequate evidence to support it constitutes an abuse of 
discretion and must be overruled by this Court." Paul Mueller 
Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Association, 657 P.2d 1279, 1287 (Utah 
1982) . Such is the case here. And the Amended Judgment 
contained no clue as to which factors, if any, were considered 
in arriving at the amount awarded. 
4. No findings or conclusions were made. This handicaps 
the Court considerably in determining whether the fees were 
reasonable. It is impossible, without findings and conclusions, 
to tell whether the above factors were properly considered in 
entering the judgment. 
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We have consistently encouraged trial courts to 
make findings to explain the factors which they 
considered relevant in arriving at an attorney fee 
award. 
Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 1215 
(Utah App. 1988) (copy attached in Appendix}; Bangerter, 663 
P.2d at 103. 
An award of attorney fees must generally be made 
on the basis of findings of fact supported by the 
evidence and appropriate conclusions of law. 
Cabrera v. Cotrell, 694 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1985). 
On a number of occasions, we have held that 
attorneys fees should be awarded on the basis of 
evidence and that findings of fact should be made 
which support the award. See Bangerter v. Poulton, 
Utah, 663 P.2d 100, 103 (1983); Hal Taylor 
Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., Utah~ 657 P.2d 
743, 750-51 (1982); Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache 
Valley Dairy Association, Utah, 657 P.2d 1279, 1287 
(1982). 
Cabrera, supra, 694 P.2d at 624. Copies of the Cabrera and 
Mueller decisions are contained in the Appendix. The Court in 
Cabrera was faced with a judgment that did not contain separate 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. However, the defect 
was held nonfatal since the order itself contained findings of 
fact and legal conclusion, including the finding that the 
attorney fee award was reasonable. Id. 
Here Cottonwood can look to no such fortuity to save its 
defective fee award. The Amended Judgment appealed from 
(Opening Br. App. B, R. 1834-47) simply observes that this Court 
in the prior appeal granted Cottonwood's cross appeal as to 
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attorney fees. Then, with no finding as to the basis or 
reasonableness of the fees, or even a reference to whether they 
are based upon affidavit, testimony or some other support, the 
Amended Judgment merely list (after the principal and interest 
on principal): 
Attorney's fees incurred by plaintiff 
in the pre-judgment phase of these 
proceedings, with interest thereon at 
the rate of 12% per annum in the amount 
of: $39,744.62 
Post-judgment attorney's fees in the 
amount of: $6,641.58 
R. 1835A, App. B to Opening Br. There is no finding as to 
reasonableness, either express or implied. The trial judge 
merely awarded Cottonwood the full amount claimed in its 
affidavit. The fact no findings were made, either separately or 
as part of the judgment, is reason alone for reversal. See, 
Cabrera, supra, 694 P.2d at 624. 
5. Fees on appeal were not for actions by Cottonwood "to 
secure possession of the premises", and should not have been 
awarded. Attorney fees are awarded in Utah only if authorized 
by statute or contract. Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 
P.2d 730, 734 (Utah 1985); see also, § 78-27-56, Utah Code (1981 
[pre-1988 version]); § 78-27-56.5, Utah Code. 
Here the award was based upon contract rights. "If 
provided for by contract, the award of attorney fees is allowed 
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only in accordance with the terms of the contract*" Dixie State 
Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988) (emphasis added). 
A trial court's discretion does not permit it to ignore the 
contract provisions. Id. at 989-990. "[A] party is entitled 
only to those fees attributable to the successful vindication of 
contractual rights within the terms of their agreement." 
Trayner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984). 
Cottonwood admits in its brief that the language which 
supports an attorney fee award provides fees for "actions by the 
lessor to secure possession of the premises at the expiration of 
the lessee's term. . . ." Response Br. p. 9. Cottonwood 
asserts that it is "[cllear from the language of the lease 
agreement that any action to enforce the terms of the lease is 
covered by the attorney fee provision." Id. Yet it points to 
no such language; only to that quoted above. 
When possession was regained by Cottonwood very early in 
the process, the right to attorney fees ended by the terms of 
the very lease. 
Sine will not reiterate here its observations about the 
language of the initial decision of this court, awarding fees as 
provided in paragraph 33 of the written lease, and costs on 
appeal. See, Opening Br. pp. 14-16. Cottonwood counters them 
by arguing, essentially, that the Court couldn't have meant what 
it said. Response Br. pp. 9-10. 
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Cottonwood cites to three cases for the proposition that 
attorney fees are available on appealf and therefor the Court 
must have meant something different. Id. at p. 10. Of course 
there is no such general rule, attorney fees being available 
only to the extent provided for in the contract, whether at 
trial or on appeal. The cases Cottonwood cites for its 
misperceived rule are unhelpful for the following reasons: 
Management Services v. Development Assoc, 617 P.2d 406 
(Utah 1980): Fees were provided in the contract for "pursuing 
any remedy provided hereunder or otherwise." They 
included an appeal to enforce the same contract. In light of 
the later cases, the rule in this case must be that fees are 
available on appeal to the same extent as at trial, if provided 
for by the contract. 
Dixon v. Stoddard, 765 P.2d 879 (Utah 1988): The 
promissory note involved allowed attorney fees for "collection, 
with or without suit. . . . " Id. at 881. Here fees were 
allowed only to retake the leased premises. 
Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834 (Utah App. 1989): Fees 
are only available "in accordance with the terms of the parties1 
agreement." Id. at 836. The Cobabe contract provided for fees 
"in connection with litigation", which was held to include a 
contested appeal. No such language is found in the Cottonwood 
lease. 
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Cottonwood did not include in its lease a broad attorney 
fee clause like those in the above cases. If it had, its fee 
award would be less vulnerable to attack. 
6. Discovery and a hearing should have been permitted. 
Ironically, Cottonwood supports its lack of proof by observing 
that although the attorney fee affidavit and its sparse 
attachments "did not reflect the specific services provided, the 
individual itemized statements for each of those charges were 
available should the trial court have desired to inspect them." 
Response Br. p. 6. 
Yet Sine objected the the proposed judgment and the 
affidavit upon which it was based, seeking discovery and a 
hearing. R. 1788-90. To say the real evidence was "available" 
to the trial court, but not to allow discovery or a hearing to 
give the court and Sine access to it is error. Those itemized 
statements were exactly the kind of evidence Sine sought in 
asking for discovery. 
A hearing should be scheduled for attorney fees not fixed 
at trial. See, Cabrera v. Cotrell, 694 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 
1985) (copy attached in Appendix}. And in the prior appeal this 
Court specifically remanded the matter "to the trial court to 
determine and fix the amount of attorney fees and trial and 
appeal costs to which plaintiff is entitled under paragraph 33 
of the written lease." Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 
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499, 503 (Utah 1988) (emphasis added). To "determine and fix" a 
fee amount implies more than lifting a number from a cursory 
affidavit, despite Sine's objections, without finding 
reasonableness, allowing discovery or holding a hearing. 
Since Cottonwood failed to respond in a meaningful way to 
Sine's arguments on discovery and the need for an evidenciary 
hearing, those points are perhaps conceded. 
7. Interest on the attorney fees should not have been 
awarded. Yet Cottonwood admits, "Over one-third of the 
$39,744.62 [pre-judgment fees] was attributable to interest 
which accrued at the rate of 12%." Response Br. p. 8. There is 
no authority for awarding retroactive interest on such an 
unliquidated amount, especially at the rate of twelve percent. 
Legal interest would generally be ten percent (but only on 
liquidated amounts. See, § 15-1-1(2), Utah Code (1989). 
CONCLUSION 
Attorney fees about 140 percent of the principal due were 
erroneously awarded. There is no basis in the prior opinion of 
this Court, or in the contract, for that kind of fee judgment. 
A conclusory affidavit without reference to the factors 
necessary to an attorney fee award, and not so much as asserting 
that the fees are reasonable, provides insufficient basis for 
the court to fix an amount. 
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Failure to make any findings of fact or conclusions of 
law, refusal to allow discovery or a hearing further subject the 
Amended Judgment to reversal. Finally, the prior decision in 
this same case limits the attorney fees to those incurred in 
regaining possession of the premises. 
The case should be reversed and remanded for a 
determination of the proper amount of attorney fees to which 
Cottonwood is entitled. 
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of July, 1990. 
Ronald C. Barker 
Mitchell R. Barker 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused an original and nine 
copies of the foregoing to be filed with the Clerk of this 
Court, by postage prepaid mail, and further that I caused four 
copies thereof to be hand mailed, postage prepaid, on this 
twenty-third day of July, 1990, to the following at the address 
indicated. 
Raymond Scott Berry 
528 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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up* VAClrlC REPORTER :d 
[111 Tht lessors argur tna: since the 
iease die no: terminate in December 1979, 
their carnages for failure ic pay me mini-
mum royalty snouid inciuae tne period up 
to Marcn, 19^0. the dale tney ciaim that 
termination occurred. The lessors did not 
file a cross-appeal and may no: now raise 
that issue. Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah 
Venture No. 1, Utah, 645 P.2d 608. 613 
(1982); Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mer-
cantile Institution, Utah, 617 P.2d 700 
(1980); Eliason v. Watts, Utah, 615 P.2d 
427 (1980). 
Affirmed. Costs to respondents. 
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM, J., concur. 
HOWE, J., concurs in the result. 
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate 
herein. 
rtavt Dec: or.r, tnr urttrmmatior. of attor-
ney's feet for :n~ defensr uf t-*e appea.. (\l 
amount of cam-re? ava raec in a case coes 
not piace a necessary iimr or the amount 
of attorneys lees mat car, i>e awarded; (o 
even tiiough. as a matter of form, it WOUJG 
ha\e been preferable for trial court to have 
entered separate findings of fact and con-
clusions of law m addition to order and 
judgment for attorneys fees, the order and 
judgment were not defective because they 
were combined with findings and conclu-
sions; and (4) charges for photocopies of 
documents, long-distance telephone 
charges, book fines, "and the like" incurred 
in trial which were not presented to trial 
court when trial costs were taxed, were not 
properly awarded as appellate costs. 
Reversed and remanded. 
( O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
John J. CABRERA, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Raiphine COTTRELL, aka Raiphine 
Kennel, et ai., Defendant and 
Respondent. 
No. 18726. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 8, 1985. 
On remand, the Third District Court, 
Tooele County, David B. Dee, J., awarded 
additional attorneys fees and costs for pro-
fessional services rendered in the success-
ful defense of an appeal arising out of an 
action to enforce a uniform real estate con-
tract. Appeal was taken. The Supreme 
Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) trial court 
erred in awarding defendant additional at-
torneys fees for trial work when sole issue 
1. Appeal and Error 01207(3) 
Trial court erred in awarding defend-
ant additional attorneys fees for trial work 
when sole issue after remand by Supreme 
Court should have been only the determina-
tion of attorney fees for the defense of the 
appeal. 
2. Costs <S=199, 207 
A party who is entitled to attorneys 
fees and costs and fails to ask for all of 
them in trial phase of case, or fails to 
adduce adequate evidence in support of a 
finding of reasonable attorneys fees, 
waives any right to claim those fees later. 
3. Costs <3=207, 208 
An award of attorneys fees must gen-
erally be made on basis of findings of facts 
supported by evidence and appropriate con-
clusions of law\ 
4. Costs <s=>199 
It is not consistent with judicial econo-
my to allow a party to apply for additional 
fees for trial work, whether in an indepen-
dent hearing, in a separate suit, or at a 
hearing to determine an award of attorneys 
fees for necessary appellate work. 
5. Cost? e=!<* 
Once a matter is htirai.ec;. or couW 
nave been litigated, a parry may no: later 
come into court to seek an addjcionai aware 
oi attorneys fees. 
6. Costs e=*208 
An attorney will have to estimate fees 
for work done on posttrial motions or ask 
trial court to schedule a hearing on attor-
neys fees either after posttrial motions are 
disposed of or after time for filing such 
motions has expired. 
7. Costs <3=>172 
''Reasonable attorneys fees" are not 
measured by what an attorney bills, nor is 
the number of hours spent on a case deter-
minative in computing fees; in determining 
reasonableness of attorney's fees, a trial 
judge may take into account provision in 
Code of Professional Responsibility specify-
ing elements that should be considered in 
setting reasonable attorneys fees, to wit, 
difficulty of litigation, efficiency of attor-
neys in presenting case, reasonableness of 
number of hours spent on case, fee custom-
arily charged in locality for similar servic-
es, amount involved in case and result at-
tained, and expertise and experience of at-
torneys involved. Code of Prof.Resp., 
DR2-106. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
8. Costs <£=>172 
Award of total attorneys fees of some 
$19,000 in a contract dispute involving a 
recovery of only $11,350 was not unreason-
able. 
9. Costs <s=»172 
Amount of damages awarded in a case 
does not place a necessary limit on the 
amount of attorneys fees that can be 
awarded. 
10. Costs <s=>172 
Attorneys fees, wrhen awarded as al-
lowed by law, are awarded as a matter of 
legal right. 
31. Cosi> c~20* 
wouic nave Deer. LTeferaM?- i^-T ;r:«; four*' 
10 have er^erec separate f:rjc::ig:; c: lac*. 
ana conclusions of lav.- in adait-or; to o~at: 
and judgment for attorneys fees, the orcer 
and judgment were not defective because 
tney were combined with findings ana con-
clusions. 
12. Costs <s=*19S 
Charges for photocopies of documents. 
long-distance telephone charges, book 
fines, "and the like" incurred in trial of 
action to enforce a uniform real estate con-
tract which were not presented to trial 
court when trial costs were taxed, were not 
properly awarded as appellate costs pursu-
ant to Supreme Court's prior remittitur to 
trial court for award of reasonable attor-
neys fees and costs incurred in defending 
the appeal of the action. 
13. Costs <3>264 
No attorneys fees were to be awrarded 
on appeal to Supreme Court, where appel-
lant was prevailing party but had not 
sought them. 
D. Kendall Perkins, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellant. 
Kent M. Kasting, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and respondent. 
STEWART, Justice. 
This is an appeal from a judgment 
awarding attorneys fees for professional 
services rendered in the successful defense 
of an appeal arising out of an action to 
enforce a uniform real estate contract. In 
Cabrera v. Cottrell, Utah, No. 17218 (filed 
February 16, 1982) (unpublished), we re-
manded this case for the trial court to 
award reasonable "attorney's fees and 
costs incurred in defending this appeal," 
pursuant to Management Services Corp. v. 
Development Associates, Utah, 617 P.2d 
406 (1980). On remand, the district court 
awrarded additional attorneys fees and 
costs in the amount of $10,906.06. The 
present appeal is from that judgment. 
6^ PACIFIC REPORTER. 2cf SZRlty 
•e-lan': c",:-.irrj? trial int. trial cour* 
Ti awarding attorneys fees for worn 
:.; u- i>o?;-tr;a] motions, preparation of 
j? of fact a:;c conclusion? of iaw. ana 
:er and judgment, in addition to tee? 
ed defending- the case on appeal.1 
The inclusion of the attorneys fee? 
.>rk done during: the trial phase of the 
••/as error for two reasons. First, our 
d was solely for the purpose of deter-
2 attorneys fees incurred as a neces-
•jart of handling the appeal. It did 
rmit any other fees or expenses to be 
ed against, the appellant. 
>] Second, a party who is entitled to 
eys fees and costs and fails to ask 
1 of them in the trial phase of the 
or fails to adduce adequate evidence 
port of a finding of reasonable attor-
fees, waives any right to claim those 
ater. An award of attorneys fees 
generally be made on the basis of 
gs of fact supported by the evidence 
ppropriate conclusions of law. Ban-
• v. Poulton, Utah, 663 P.2d 100, 103 
. Cf. Christensen v. Farmers Insur-
Exchange, Utah, 669 P.2d 1236, 1239 
; Girard v. Appleby, Utah, 660 P.2d 
47 (1983); Hansen v. Gossett, Utah, 
.2d 1258, 1261 (1979). It is not con-
t with judicial economy to allow a 
to apply for additional fees for trial 
whether in an independent hearing, 
aparate suit, or at a hearing to deter-
m award of attorneys fees for neces-
.ppeilate work. Once the matter is 
ed, or could have been litigated, a 
may not later come into court to seek 
reliant claims that the amount attributable 
ic trial phase of the case amounts to 
0.85. It is clear from the trial court's find-
that fees were awarded for the trial phase, 
;ie amount is not stated. Since we have no 
cript of the hearing, wc cannot determine 
in fact the amount was. It will have to be 
mined on the remand of this matter. The 
ter apparently lost the transcript of the 
ng on the attorneys fees matter, and that is 
herefore, before us. The appellant might, 
ver, have proceeded by way of an agreed 
nenl of record on appeal pursuant to Rule 
, Utah R.Civ.P., but did not do so. 
2-106 provides: 
(A) A lawyer shall not enter into an agree-
ment for, charge, or collect an illegal or clear-
ly excessive fee. 
(B) A fee is clearly excessive when, after a 
review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary pru-
dence would be left with a definite and firm 
conviction that the fee is in excess of a reason-
able fee. Factors to be considered as guides 
in determining the reasonableness of a fee 
include the following: 
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty 
and difficulty of the questions involved, and 
the skill requisite to perform the legal services 
properly. 
an attorney wil: have to estimate fees for 
work done on post-trial motions or ask the 
thai court to schedule a hearing on attor-
neys fees either after post-trial motions art-
disposed of or after the time for filing sue:? 
motions has expired. 
In the instant case, the trial court, after 
the prior remand of this case, erred in 
awarding the respondent additional attor-
neys fees for trial work when the sole issue 
should have been only the determination of 
attorneys fees for the defense of the ap-
peal. Therefore, the fees awarded for trial 
work must be deducted from the attorneys 
fees awarded for the appeal. 
Appellant also contends that the attor-
neys fees awrarded are too high and there-
fore unreasonable and that respondent is 
entitled only to reasonable attorneys fees. 
Appellant claims that the award of total 
attorneys fees of some $19,000 in a con-
tract dispute involving a recovery of only 
$11,350 is per se unreasonable. 
[7] Reasonable attorneys fees are not 
measured by what an attorney actually 
bills, nor is the number of hours spent on 
the case determinative in computing fees. 
In determining the reasonableness of attor-
neys fees, a trial judge may take into ac-
count the provision in the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility which specifies the el-
ements that should be considered in setting 
reasonable attorneys fees. Utah Code of 
Professional Responsibility DR 2-106.2 A 
LANIER *. :V[>L"STJ":IAL iOM'S Or IT AH 
e-ur: rr.av ror.ricer. amontr ot^er f^ctor^ 
me diificuiry o: the hti^ratjor.. tne iffjcier-
cy of tne attorney? in presenting :ne cas.£. 
me reasonableness of the number cf nours 
spent or the case, me fee customarily 
chanred m the iocaiity for similar services, 
the amount involved in the case and tne 
result attained, ana the expertise and expe-
rience of the attorneys involved. 
[8. 9] The total amount of the attorneys 
fees awarded in this case cannot be said to 
be unreasonable just because it is greater 
than the amount recovered on the contract. 
The amount of the damages awarded in a 
case does not place a necessary limit on the 
amount of attorneys fees that can be 
awarded. 
[10] Furthermore, contrary to appel-
lant's contention that attorneys fees should 
be determined on the basis of an equitable 
standard, attorneys fees, when awarded as 
allowed by law, are awarded as a matter of 
legal right. 
[11] The appellant also contends that 
the attorneys fees awarded were not sup-
ported by a finding of reasonableness. On 
a number of occasions, we have held that 
attorneys fees should be awarded on the 
basis of evidence and that findings of fact 
should be made which support the awrard. 
See Bangerter v. Poulton, Utah, 663 P.2d 
100, 103 (1983); Hal Taylor Associates v. 
Unionamerica, Inc., Utah, 657 P.2d 743, 
750-51 (1982); Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache 
Valley Dairy Association, Utah, 657 P.2d 
1279, 1287 (1982). In the instant case, the 
trial court did not enter separate findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, at least 
denominated as such. However, the order 
and judgment did contain findings of fact 
and legal conclusions, including the finding 
that the award was reasonable. As a mat-
ter of form, it would have been preferable 
for the trial court to have entered separate 
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, 
that the acceptance of the particular employ-
ment will preclude other employment by the 
lawyer. 
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locali-
ty for similar legal services. 
(4) The amount involved and results ob-
tained. 
Utah Rep 693-702 P.2d—4 
contends tnat charge- for photocopier of 
documents. iong-distanee te;eprior:e 
charges, book fines, "ano the like" were. 
incurred in tne trial of the case and were 
not allowable on this appeal. Since they 
were not presented to the trial court when 
trial costs were taxed, they were not prop-
erly awarded as appellate costs pursuant to 
our prior remittitur, apart from whether 
they were taxable at all. 
[13] Reversed and remanded to the trial 
court to delete all attorneys fees and costs 
not associated with the appeal of this mat-
ter. No attorneys fees are to be awarded 
on this appeal since the appellant is the 
prevailing party but has not sought them. 
Costs to appellant. 
HALL, C.J., and HOWE, DURHAM and 
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
Donald LANIER, Plaintiff. 
v. 
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, Department of Employment 
Security, Defendant. 
No. 19862. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 11, 1985. 
Claimant appealed from a decision of 
the Board of Review of the Industrial Com-
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client 
or by the circumstances. 
(6) The nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client. 
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of 
ihe lawyer or lawyers performing the servic-
es. 
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
PAUL MUELLER CO. v. CACHE VALLEY 
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where we quoted with approval the follow-
ing' statements from Roberts on Frauds, 
135: 
To call anything a part performance be-
fore the existence of the thing (the con-
tract) whereof it is said to be part per-
formance is established, is an anticipation 
of proof by assumption, ana gets rid of 
the statute by jumping over it, for the 
statute requires proof, and prescribes the 
medium of proof. 
We further stated that if possession by 
the buyer is relied upon as part perform-
ance, it should be established without quali-
fication or doubt. In the instant case there 
was considerable dispute as to the identity 
of the exact land possessed by the buyers. 
Evidence was presented that the sellers had 
occupied the 20 acres adjacent to the home 
and built improvements on it, yet at other 
times had fenced and occupied the 20 acres 
where the oil well was located. The buyers, 
who claim that the 20 acres reserved by the 
sellers was near the home, readily admit 
that they cut the hay from this ground, and 
that they made no objection when the sell-
ers allowed oil drilling equipment upon the 
20 acres down in the field. This being a 
case at equity where we are permitted to 
review the facts as well as the law, I am 
compelled to conclude that the parol evi-
dence offered to prove the identity of the 
420 acres possessed by the buyers was any-
thing but clear and definite. I would deny 
the buyers specific performance. 
I concede that the recent decision of Reed 
v. Alvey, Utah, 610 P.2d 1374 (1980) con-
tains broad language (quoted in the majori-
ty opinion) which seemingly might autho-
rize the admission of parol testimony in the 
instant case. That case, however, did not 
purport to overrule any prior decision of 
this Court and I would limit the broad 
language to the facts of that case, viz., 
there was no real dispute as to what proper-
ty the parties intended to sell or buy .since 
the seller had sold to others all his property 
at that address except the unit claimed by 
the plaintiff buyer. 
I am in accord with an observation made 
by Justice Frick in Adams v. Manning, 46 
Utah at 86, 148 P. at 466, where he said: 
It has, however, always seemed to tne 
writer that unless the courts are very 
careful in tne admission of paro; evioenct 
and in acting upon tne mere innerer; 
probabilities as such appear tc tne cou t^f 
they will. ir. equiu. enforce paro cor-
tracts which are clear!) within tm stat-
ute as readily as courts of law enforce a: 
other contracts and we thus entirely f i t-
ter away the statute of frauds. 
See the dissenting opinion of Justice Wil-
kins in Stauffer v. Call, Utah, 589 P.2d 1219 
(1979). I can only add that what the trial 
court did here flies in the face of the pur-
pose of the statute of frauds. If the stat-
ute served no purpose, then the Legislature 
should repeal it, but this Court should not 
make inroads upon it to achieve our sense 
of justice in a given case. 
PAUL MUELLER COMPANY, a Missouri 
corporation, and Dahle Construction, a 
Utah partnership, Plaintiffs, Appellants 
and Cross-Respondents, 
v. 
CACHE VALLEY DAIRY ASSOCIATION, 
a Utah agricultural cooperative corpora-
tion, Defendant, Respondent and Cross-
Appellant. 
PAUL MUELLER COMPANY, a Missouri 
Corporation, and Dahle Construction 
Company, a Utah partnership, Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
v. 
CACHE VALLEY DAIRY ASSOCIATION, 
a Utah agricultural cooperative corpora-
tion, Defendant and Respondent. 
Nos. 17743, 17745. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 6, 1982. 
Subcontractors appealed from a judg-
ment of the First District Court, Cache 
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County, VeNoy Chnstoffersen, J., refusing 
to enforce their claimed mechanics' hens 
against owner on wney drying equipment 
and owner cross-appealed from denial of its 
counterclaim relating to defective manufac-
ture and installation of the equipment 
The Supreme Court, Hall, C.J., held that 
(1) evidence did not compel finding that 
whey dryer was annexed to owner's proper-
ty for mechanics' hen purposes; (2) whey 
drying equipment was not adapted to own-
er's property for mechanics' lien purposes; 
(3) refusal to recognize lien in subcontractor 
against manlift and walkways installed in 
owner's building was not error; (4) subcon-
tractors did not owe owner a manufactur-
er's duty of reasonable care to guard 
against economic loss to users of its prod-
uct; (5) even if subcontractors had breach-
ed duty towards owner by defectively con-
structing drying chamber, owmer had failed 
to prove causation and damages and there-
fore was not entitled to recover; and (6) 
statement of owner's counsel at posttnal 
hearing did not provide adequate evidentia-
ry basis for equal apportionment of attor-
ney fee award between subcontractors. 
Remanded. 
1. Mechanics' Liens <s=>30 
Mere physical attachment to building 
does not necessarily confer fixture status 
upon what would otherwise constitute per-
sonal property for mechanics' lien purposes, 
U.C.A.1953, 14-2-1, 14-2-2, 38-1-3, 38-1-
4. 
2. Mechanics' Liens <s=>281(l) 
Evidence did not compel finding that 
whey dryer, which was attached to owner's 
building by means of ducts, wiring and 
welding and partially bolted into cement 
floor, was annexed to owner's property for 
mechanics' lien purposes. U.C.A.1953, 14-
2-1, 14-2-2, 38-1-3, 38-1-4. 
3. Mechanics' Liens <s=>32 
"Adaptation" of equipment to property 
for mechanics' lien purposes occurs when 
personal property is integrated inr> re^ 
p^opem m furtnerance of specifK pan>is.~ 
to vhicr rea> property has Deer, devotee 
e.g.. when owner of brief kiln integrate? 
furnace into kun U C.A 1953. 14-Z-l. : , -
2-2. 38-1-3. 35-1-i 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for otner judicial constructions ana 
definitions 
4. Mechanics* Liens <s=>32 
Equipment is not "adapted" to use of 
real property for mechanics' lien purposes 
where real property itself is adaptable to 
multiple uses and where it is solely the 
presence of the equipment itself which de-
termines purpose served b) real property. 
U.C.A.1953, 14-2-1, 14-2-2, 38-1-3, 38-1-
4. 
5. Mechanics' Liens <s=>32 
Where real property m question con-
sisted of prefabricated metal building with 
concrete floor, manlift, walkways and sup-
porting structures, building had no charac-
teristics which in any way limited its use to 
whey drying, building did not exist as whey 
drying "plant" prior to owner's acquisition 
of whey drying equipment in question, and 
owner connected equipment to building in 
manner which allowed removal of equip-
ment without significant damage to build-
ing, building was suitable for multiple uses 
rather than for single use corresponding to 
function of whey drying equipment and 
therefore equipment was not "adapted" to 
building for mechanics' lien purposes. U.C. 
A.1953, 14-2-1, 14-2-2, 38-1-3, 38-1-4. 
6. Mechanics' Liens <s=>29 
Refusal to recognize lien in subcontrac-
tor against manlift and walkways installed 
in owner's building was not error, notwith-
standing that such items were not found to 
be personal property, where subcontractor 
presented no evidence as to percentage of 
total labor expended towards construction 
of manlift and walkways other than rough 
guess by company's managing partner, nor 
did subcontractor attempt to establish per-
centage of current balance due which repre-
PAUL MUELLER CO. v. CACHE \ ALLEY DAIRY ASS'X Uta: 12SI 
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sented such labor, and evidence snowed thfct 
suDcontractor recenec partial payment fo" 
its mstailatior laoor prior to genera, cor-
tractor's ban>:ruptc\ and tnat manhft v>m> 
first item installed t>\ subcontractor U.C 
A.1953. 14-2-1, 14-2-2, 38-1-8, 38-1-4 
7. Negligence <s=»2 
Subcontractors, with whom general 
contractor respectively contracted to con-
struct whey drying cylinders, a drying 
chamber and other parts of whey drying 
system and to assemble and install system, 
who provided their products and services to 
presumably knowledgeable contractor in ac-
cordance with detailed contract specifica-
tions, who did not conceal alleged defects in 
drying chamber from contractor, and who 
were in no better position than contractor 
to anticipate possible economic conse-
quences of defects, did not owe owner a 
manufacturer's duty of reasonable care to 
guard against economic loss to users of its 
product, and contractor bore responsibility 
for correction of defects. 
8. Negligence <s=»103 
Even if subcontractors, with whom 
general contractor respectively contracted 
to construct whey drying cylinders, drying 
chamber and other parts of whey drying 
system and to assemble and install system, 
had breached duty towards owner by defec-
tively constructing drying chamber, where 
evidence showed no actual loss to owner's 
business resulting from alleged defects, and 
owner's brief contained no discussion con-
cerning either causation or damages, owner 
had failed to prove causation and damage 
and could not recover for alleged breach. 
9. Appeal and Error <s=>984(5) 
Supreme Court's policy is to accord 
great deference to discretionary conclusions 
of trial court regarding attorney fees. 
10. Costs «=> 207 
Evidentiary basis is fundamental re-
quirement for establishing award of attor-
ney fees 
Utah Rep 656 659 P2d~i0 
11. Costs e=*207 
Av%ard of a t t o n ^ fees maot withou4 
aaecuate evidence to suDtrrt it constitute.-
anase of discretion ana must Dt o\eyrJL^ 
0} Supreme Court 
12. Mechanics' Liens e=»310(3/ 
Statement of owner's coanse. at post-
trial hearing m mechanics' hen actior that 
he had spent equal time defending Doth of 
subcontractors' claims did not provide ade-
quate evidentiary basis for equal apportion-
ment of award of attorney fees to owner 
between subcontractors where there was no 
indication that statement was derived from 
stipulated billing records, nor from any oth-
er competent evidentiary source 
13. Mechanics' Liens s=>310(3) 
In mechanics' hen action against owner 
who asserted counterclaim, only those billa-
ble hours attributable to owner's defense of 
mam causes of action were compensable 
pursuant to attorney fee award. 
14. Mechanics' Liens c=>310(3) 
Award of $17,000 in attorney fees to 
owner, who asserted counterclaim against 
subcontractors in mechanics' lien action 
against him, was derived from sound evi-
dentiary basis where counterclaim was un-
successful and trial court had sufficient in-
formation m billing records to enable it to 
separate counterclaim hours from those 
spent in defense of mam causes of action. 
Bruce L. Jorgensen, Gary N. Anderson 
and Gordon J Low, Logan, for plaintiffs, 
appellants and cross-respondents. 
B.H. Harris, George W. Preston and Jo-
seph M. Chambers, Logan, for defendant, 
respondent and cross-appellant 
HALL, Chief Justice. 
Appellants Paul Mueller Company (Muel-
ler) and Dahle Construction Company 
(Dahle) appeal from the trial court's refusal 
to enforce their claimed mechanic's hens 
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against respondent Cache Valley Dairy As-
sociation on whey drying equipment pos-
sessed by the latter. Respondent in turn, 
cross-appeals from thai court's denial of its 
counterclaim relating to defective manufac-
ture and installation of the equipment by 
appellants. In addition, appellants and re-
spondent all contest the amount of attorney 
fees awarded by the court to respondent 
I. Appellants' Claim 
In 1978, respondent contracted with 
Maxum Corporation (Maxum), a Delaware 
firm, for the installation of a whey drying 
system on respondent's premises. Maxum 
subcontracted with appellant Mueller to 
construct four large drying cylinders, a dry-
ing chamber and other parts of the system 
and with appellant Dahle to assemble and 
install the system. In order to house the 
whey drying equipment, respondent en-
gaged a separate contractor to pour a ce-
ment foundation and to assemble a four-
story prefabricated metal building thereon. 
Following the manufacture by Mueller of 
the parts ordered by Maxum, Dahle assem-
bled the large drying chamber and cylinders 
and moved them into the building. Dahle 
also constructed a manlift and walkwrays 
within the building and installed various 
ducts, frameworks and other equipment in 
order to connect parts of the system to each 
other and to the building. 
After respondent had paid Maxum in full 
for the drying system, Maxum declared 
bankruptcy, leaving unpaid balances owing 
to both Mueller and Dahle. Mueller and 
Dahle each filed a notice of lien upon the 
whey drying equipment under the provi-
sions of U.C.A., 1953, §§ 38-1-3 and 38-1-
4. The former statute states: 
Contractors, subcontractors and all per-
sons performing any services or furnish-
ing or renting any materials or equip-
ment used in the construction, alteration, 
or improvement of any building or struc-
ture or improvement to any premises in 
any manner . . . shall have a lien upon 
the property upon or concerning which 
they have rendered service, performed la-
bor or furnisfteo or rented material?, or 
equipment for the value of trie service 
renaered. labor performed or materials or 
equipment furnished or rented r>y each 
respectively, whether at the instance of 
the owner or any other person acting by 
his authority as agent, contractor or oth-
erwise. 
Appellants then filed this action against 
respondent to foreclose the alleged liens, 
claiming also that respondent should bear 
liability for the debts of its contractor un-
der the provisions of U.C.A., 1953v §§ 14-
2-1 and 14-2-2. Those statutes provide, 
respectively, as follows: 
The owner of any interest in land enter-
ing into a contract, involving $2,000 or 
more, for the construction, addition to, or 
alteration or repair of, any building, 
structure or improvement upon land 
shall, before any such work is com-
menced, obtain from the contractor a 
bond in a sum equal to the contract price, 
with good and sufficient sureties, condi-
tioned for the faithful performance of the 
contract and prompt payment for materi-
al furnished and labor performed under 
the contract. Such bond shall run to the 
owner and to all other persons as their 
interest may appear; and any person who 
has furnished materials or performed la-
bor for or upon any such building, struc-
ture or improvement, payment for which 
has not been made, shall have a direct 
right of action against the sureties upon 
such bond for the reasonable value of the 
materials furnished or labor performed, 
not exceeding, however, in any case the 
prices agreed upon . . . . [Emphasis add-
ed.] 
Any person subject to the provisions of 
this chapter, who shall fail to obtain such 
good and sufficient bond, or to exhibit 
the same, as herein required, shall be 
personally liable to all persons who have 
furnished materials or performed labor 
under the contract for the reasonable val-
ue of such materials furnished or labor 
performed, not exceeding, however, in 
any case the prices agreed upon. 
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The trial court found that the equipment 
manufactured by Mueller and much of the 
equipment installed by Dahle constituted 
personal property rather than improve-
ments to realty as required b\ §§ 14-2-1 
and 38-1-4. and that appellants therefore 
held no statutory liens upon the equipment 
Although tne court found tne manhft an" 
walkways constructed b> Dahle to oe fu-
tures to which a statutory hen might app'}. 
the court refused to recognize such a hen on 
the part of Dahie. finding no substantial 
evidence to indicate what percentage of 
Maxum's debt to Dahle represented work 
on the latter items and what percentage 
represented assembly of the items found to 
be personal property. Appellants contend 
that the evidence clearly preponderates 
against these findings, requiring instead a 
finding that all of the whey drying equip-
ment constituted "structure^] or improve-
ments] upon land" subject to the statutory 
liens. 
In distinguishing between real and per-
sonal property for statutory lien purposes, 
this Court has adopted a tripartite test, 
giving consideration to the following fac-
tors: 
(1) [the] manner in which the item is 
attached or annexed to realty; (2) wheth-
er the item is adaptable to the particular 
use of the realty; and (3) the intention of 
the annexor to make an item a perma-
nent part of the realty.1 
The trial court referred to the above 
three factors in determining the lien status 
of respondent's equipment, finding: 
After the examination [of] the manner 
in which the equipment was attached, 
and the particular use of the machinery 
and the intent of the parties, the Court 
determines the said equipment to be per-
sonalty . . . . 
We therefore review the evidence presented 
concerning the elements of annexation, ad-
1. State v. Papamkolas, 19 Utah 2d 153, 427 
P.2d 749, 751 (1967). 
aptation anG intent in oraer to oetermme 
whether such evidence supports the triai 
court's findings. Appellants and respon-





, this Court ' 
A Annexation 










drying equipment w&t atiachec to tne 
building b\ means of oucu wiring anc 
welding and that some eoupmen: was boU-
eo into the cement floor However, mere 
physical attachment to a building does net 
necessarily confer fixture status upon what 
would otherwise constitute personal proper-
ty.3 In the present case, respondent 
presented evidence to show that most of the 
ducts and wires connecting equipment to 
the metal building consisted of detachable 
sections designed for easy removal and that 
respondent requested the attachment of 
lifting lugs to the larger pieces of equip-
ment so that they could be more easily 
lifted and transported from the building. 
The trial court, having personally inspected 
the whey drying equipment in the presence 
of counsel, found that the bolts securing 
machinery to the floor could be disconnect-
ed easily and that equipment could be re-
moved without damage to the building. 
The evidence therefore did not compel a 
finding that the whey dryer was annexed to 
respondent's property. 
B. Adaptation 
[3,4] Appellants claim that the whey 
drying equipment wTas adapted to respon-
dent's property by virtue of the fact that 
the building housing the equipment was 
used solely for whey drying. Appellants 
misinterpret the concept of adaptation as 
used by courts in determining the character 
of property. Adaptation occurs when per-
3. Workman v Henrie, 71 Utah 400, 266 P 1033 
(1928), King Brothers, Inc v. Utah Dry Kiln 
Co, 13 Utah 2d 339, 374 P 2d 254 (1962) 
2. Del Porto v. 
(1972). 
Nicolo, Utah, 495 P.2d 811 
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sonal property is integrated into real prop-
erty in furtherance of a specific ouroose U 
which the real property has Deen devotea 
as, for example, when the owner of a brick 
kiln integrates a furnace into tne kiln4 
Eauipment is not "adapted" to the use of 
real property where the real property itself 
is adaptable to multiple uses and where it is 
solely the presence of the equipment itself 
which determines the purpose served by the 
real property. 
[5] In the present case, the real proper-
ty in question consists of a prefabricated 
metal building with a concrete floor, a man-
lift, walkways and supporting structures. 
The building itself has no characteristics 
which in any way limit its use to whey 
drying, nor did it exist as a whey drying 
"plant" prior to respondent's acquisition of 
the equipment in question. As noted above, 
respondent connected the equipment to the 
building in a manner which allows removal 
of the equipment without significant dam-
age to the building. The trial court, in its 
findings, observed: 
The whey drying equipment is not one 
[sic] that was made or constructed for the 
particular use of this building but was 
suitable for any other plant of this na-
ture. This building was constructed for 
and adapted to house this machinery 
much in the same way that many build-
ings are constructed to house farm ma-
chinery, or fabricated machinery which 
remain personalty. That machinery in 
question here has nothing to do with 
servicing the building such as a furnace 
and duct work do a house for heating 
purposes. 
The court correctly found respondent's 
building to be suitable for multiple uses 
rather than for a single use corresponding 
to the function of the whey drying equip-
ment. 
4. King Brothers, Inc v Utah Dry Kiln Co, 
supra, n. 3. See Progress Press-Brick & Ma-
chine Co v Gratiot Brick & Quarry Co., 151 
Mo. 501, 52 SW. 401 (1899). 
C Intention of tnt re<x propertv owner 
The parties arret: that of int three ele-
ments to oe considerec IF determining 
whether the wne\ a*yer i? rea* or personal 
property, the most important is intention 
Concerning this element, this Cour: has 
stated 
In order to quanfj unaer these [mechan-
ic's hen] statutes it is necessar\ that 
there must be annexation to the land 
and this must have been done with the 
intention of making [the personal proper-
ty] a permanent part thereof. [Emphasis 
added.]5 
Factors to be considered m determining 
whether such an intention exists include 
annexation and adaptation, discussed above, 
as well as 
the relation and situation of the party 
making the annexation, the policy of the 
law in relation thereto, the structure and 
mode of the annexation, and the purpose 
or use for which the annexation has been 
made.6 
In the present case, testimony by respon-
dent's general manager tends to show an 
absence of intent on the part of respondent 
to incorporate the whey drying equipment 
into its real property 
[T]he building was designed specifically 
so that we could house that piece of 
equipment, so that we could get that 
piece of equipment into the building, so 
that we could get that piece of equipment 
out of the building without any particular 
problem if at some time down the line in 
the future we decided that the economies 
in whey drying justified us going into 
some other drying operation. 
* * * * * * 
The reason we chose a metal building 
was because of its versatility. It's a con-
6. Builders Appliance Supply Co v AR John 
Construction Co, 253 Or 582, 455 P2d 615 
(1969) 
5. King Brothers Inc v. Utah Dry Kiln Co, 
supra, n. 3 
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Leasing Compam characterize UK wne; 
drying equipment as persona1 prot>er^ 
AppellanU compiain thai me provisions of 
the agreement are irreievart to tnc preser: 
issue and that the tna, court snou": n<>v 
ha\e admitted the agreement Appellant 
claim that by doing so, thai court imposed 
upon appellants the terms of a contract to 
which they were not parties 
The findings of the trial court do not 
indicate that the characterization of respon-
dent's property contained m the lease 
agreement in any way influenced the 
court's own decision concerning the nature 
of the property Even assuming that the 
court did consider provisions of the lease as 
evidence, the lease constituted only one of 
many items of evidence presented on the 
issue of respondent's intent. If the court 
had excluded the lease from other such 
evidence, that which remained still would 
not preponderate against that court's find-
ings. Therefore, we need not consider the 
propriety of the court's admission of the 
lease. 
[6] Appellant Dahle claims that because 
the trial court did not find the manlift and 
walkwrays to be personal property, the court 
should have enforced a lien against these 
items for a portion of the total balance 
owed to Dahle. However, Dahle presented 
no evidence as to wThat percentage of its 
total labor had been expended towards con-
struction of the manlift and walkways oth-
er than a rough guess by the company's 
managing partner Nor did Dahle attempt 
to establish the percentage of its current 
balance due which represented such labor. 
The evidence shows that Dahle received 
partial payment for its installation labor 
prior to Maxum's bankruptcy and that the 
manlift was the first item installed by 
Dahle. The trial court reasonably may 
have concluded that the portion of Dahle's 
labor for which early payment was made 
included much or all of the labor incurred in 
construction of the items which it deter-
mined to be fixtures. The court therefore 
did not err in refusing to recognize in Dahle 
a lien against these items 
struction which is bolted together, it's 
very easily unbolted, and it provides max-
imum flexibility and the moving m and 
moving out of equipment 
Testimony by a salesman of dairy equip-
ment showed that it is common practice to 
transport used whey drying equipment 
from its original location for purposes of 
sale or use in another locality. 
Q Do you have an opinion as to 
whether or not those tanks could be 
moved from Cache Valley Dairy to anoth-
er place? 
A Certainly they could be moved. 
Q And are they a merchantable type 
item that might be purchased by some 
other individual in the same business 
somewhere else in the country? 
A Yes. 
Q Would there be a problem with sell-
ing that type of equipment? 
A Not very, no. 
Q Is there a demand for that type of 
equipment? 
A You bet. 
. . . I particularly am not adaptable to 
whey drying equipment, but I'm familiar 
with it and it's bought and sold, used and 
new. 
Q And I assume when it's bought and 
sold it has to change places and locations 
and everything? 
A Oh, yes. 
Respondent's attachment of lifting lugs to 
the whey drying cylinders and its provision 
for relatively easy disconnection of the 
equipment also tend to show an absence of 
intention to annex the equipment. 
In addition to the above structural and 
testimonial evidence as to the character of 
respondent's equipment, the trial court ad-
mitted as evidence a lease agreement be-
tween respondent and First Security Leas-
ing Company by which respondent had ac-
quired the whey drying equipment. In that 
agreement, respondent and First Security 
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II. Respondent's Counterclaim 
Respondent counterclaimed against each 
appellant. Respondent alleged that Dahie 
had improperly welded tne drying chamber 
and that Mueller had omitted certain verti-
cal joining flanges from the chamber, de-
creasing its structural integrity. Claiming 
that these and other defects rendered the 
chamber worthless, respondent requested 
damages from appellants under theories of 
negligence, breach of contract and slander 
of title. The trial court denied respondent's 
counterclaim. 
In appealing the denial of its counter-
claim, respondent relies solely on negligence 
theory, contending that appellants owed to 
it a manufacturer's duty of due care. Re-
spondent claims that a manufacturer must 
exercise care not only to guard against inju-
ry to foreseeable users of its product, but 
also to protect such users from economic 
loss attributable to nondangerous defects in 
the product. In support of this proposition, 
respondent cites W.R.H. v. Economy Build-
ers Supply,1 a case decided after issuance of 
the trial court's final order. Respondent 
urges this Court to consider that order in 
light of the W.R.H. decision. 
[7] Assuming, arguendo, that the 
W.R.H. case established a duty of reasona-
ble care on the part of a manufacturer to 
guard against economic loss to users of its 
product, such a duty wrould not apply to 
appellants in the present case. Appellants 
are not "manufacturers*' comparable to the 
manufacturer in the W.R.H. case. While 
the latter manufactured products destined 
for retail sale to unknown and potentially 
inexperienced purchasers, appellants pro-
vided their products and services to a pre-
sumably knowledgeable contractor in ac-
cordance with detailed contract specifica-
tions. Appellants in no way concealed the 
alleged defects in the drying chamber from 
Maxum and were in no better position to 
anticipate possible economic consequences 
of such defects than was Maxum itself. 
Having contracted directly with Maxum 
and knowing of MaxumV close supervisor 
of the entire installation procebs. apnellanb 
had reasor to expect that Maxum WOUJ^  
proieci respondent s interest by onservm*: 
and obtaining correction of obvious defects 
The trial court correctly found that Maxum 
bore responsibility for correction o; sucr 
defects. 
[8] Even if appellants had breached a 
duty towards respondent by defectively 
constructing the drying chamber, the evi-
dence would not supp>ort recovery by re-
spondent in the absence of a showing that 
the alleged defects actually caused damages 
to respondent. Although respondent in its 
brief alleges that the drying chamber fails 
to meet U.S.D.A. standards and that it has 
no value, testimony shows that it was using 
the chamber and other drying equipment at 
the time of trial. The evidence shows no 
actual loss to respondent's business result-
ing from the alleged defects and respon-
dent's brief contains no discussion whatso-
ever concerning either causation or dam-
ages. We hold that respondent has shown 
neither a duty on the part of appellants to 
protect it against nondangerous, nonconc-
ealed defects in the drying chamber nor the 
additional elements of causation and dam-
ages. The trial court therefore correctly 
denied respondent's counterclaim. 
III. Attorney Fees 
The trial court awarded to respondent 
$17,000 in attorney fees, dividing liability 
for this amount equally between appellants. 
Although appellants concede that the 
amount of the award is reasonable, appel-
lant Dahie contests the equal apportion-
ment of that award between itself and ap-
pellant Mueller. Dahle asserts that because 
of the fact that Mueller asserted a signifi-
cantly larger claim on respondent's proper-
ty than did Dahle, Mueller's responsibility 
for attorney fees should be proportionately 
greater than that of Dahle. Dahle claims 
7. Utah, 633 P.2d 42 (1981). 
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that the court had no evidentiary basis upon 
which to divide liability equally between 
appellants. 
At the post-trial hearing concerning the 
court's proposed findings of fact and con-
clusions of law, counsel for Dahie pointed 
out that the court had failed to apportion 
liability for the $17,000 award, whereupon 
the court entertained suggestions from the 
various counsel as to the proper method of 
apportionment. Dahie'? counsel proposed 
that each plaintiff be assessed an amount, in 
proportion to its original claim against re-
spondent. The court's decision to divide the 
liability equally followed a statement by 
counsel for respondent that he had spent 
equal time defending both claims. Dahle 
contends that this statement alone consti-
tuted an inadequate basis upon which to 
make that decision. 
[9] It is this Court's policy to accord 
great deference to the discretionary conclu-
sions of the trial court regarding attorney 
fees. "In the absence of abuse of discre-
tion, the amount of the awrard by the dis-
trict court will not be disturbed."8 How-
ever, the long-standing rule regarding the 
establishment of attorney fees is as was 
discussed and articulated in the case of Ma-
son v. Mason.9 "It is well established that 
to justify a finding of a reasonable attor-
ney's fee, there must be evidence in support 
of that finding/' (Emphasis added.) 
A more recent, and somew?hat more em-
phatic declaration of this rule was made in 
the case of Freed Finance Co. v. Stoker 
Motor Co.10 In Freed, a substantial attor-
ney fee award was included in the trial 
court's order of summary judgment. On 
review, this Court held: 
Even if there were no disputed issue of 
material fact, the summary judgment 
8. Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Manage-
ment, Utah, 645 P.2d 667, 671 (1982). 
9. 108 Utah 428, 160 P.2d 730, 733 (1945). 
10. Utah, 537 P.2d 1039, 1040 (1975). 
could not award an attorney's fee without 
a stipulation as to the amount, an unre-
butted affidavit, or evidence given a= to 
the value thereof. 
Id. at 1040. 
[10.11] A similar application of this rule 
is found in the case of Richards v. HOQSORU 
which is one of several cases cited a^  au-
thority for the Freed decision. There, the 
Court stated: "This Court has on numerous-
occasions held that attorney's fee? cannot 
be allowed unless there is evidence to sup-
port them." Id. at 1046. It is beyond dis-
pute that an evidentiary basis is a funda-
mental requirement for establishing an 
award of attorney fees. It follows, there-
fore, that an award made without adequate 
evidence to support it constitutes an abuse 
of discretion and must be overruled by this 
Court. 
In this case, the parties by stipulation 
presented detailed billing records to the 
court as the evidentiary basis upon which 
the court could determine a reasonable at-
torney fee award for the prevailing party. 
The record indicates, however, that the 
court's decision to apportion the liability 
equally was not based on this evidence, but 
rather was derived wholly from the post-tri-
al statement of counsel. 
[12] In the case of Sharp v. Hui Wahine, 
Inc.}2 a mortgagee was denied attorney 
fees after successfully prosecuting a fore-
closure suit, because counsel had not of-
fered evidence other than his opinion to 
support the award he sought. The Hawaii 
Supreme Court stated: 
Counsel submitted neither evidence of the 
customary charges of the Bar nor any 
expert testimony other than their own 
self-serving opinions to show the reasona-
bleness of their fees. As has been aptly 
11. 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044, 1046 (1971). 
See also, Brasher Motor and Finance Co. v. 
Anderson, 20 Utah 2d 104, 433 P.2d 608 (1967). 
12. Hawaii, 413 P.2d 242 (1966). 
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stated: ". . . while the mortgagee's at-
torney may not be an incompetent wit-
ness, it is not good practice to make an 
award [of an attorney fee] predicated 
only on his opinion." 59 C.J.S. Mortgages 
§ 812e(2). at 1554. 
Id. at 246, 247. The foregoing ruling is in 
accord with the evidentiary rule set forth 
by this Court in the Mason. Freed and Rich-
ards cases, supra. The statement of respon-
dents' counsel at the post-trial hearing did 
not provide an adequate evidentiary basis 
for the trial court's apportionment ruling. 
There was no indication that the statement 
was derived from the stipulated billing rec-
ords, nor from any other competent eviden-
tiary source. It was, therefore, an abuse of 
discretion for the trial court to rely on that 
statement to support its apportionment de-
cision. 
Counsel for respondent claims that al-
though the trial court may have properly 
apportioned its attorney fee award, the 
amount of that award is inadequate. De-
tailed billing records prepared by respon-
dent's counsel show a total of 693 billable 
hours spent in defense against appellants' 
claims and in prosecution of respondent's 
counterclaim, for which counsel billed $47,-
000. The lower court awarded to respon-
dent $17,000 in attorney fees. Respondent 
contends that this award represents only 
36% of the actual attorney fees incurred, 
that it is grossly inadequate and that it does 
not constitute a reasonable attorney fee. 
In response, appellants point out that a 
large measure of the billable hours of re-
spondent's counsel are attributable to his 
prosecution of the counterclaim. Because 
the counterclaim was unsuccessful, the 
hours spent in the prosecution thereof are 
noncompensable. Appellants' reasoning is 
supported by this Court's recent decision in 
the case of Utah Farm Production Credit 
Association v. CoxP There, the Court re-
fused to award attorney fees altogether, 
because the prevailing plaintiff failed to 
provide enougn proof to enable the court to 
distinguish the portion of plaintiff? fees 
spent in prosecuting the complaint from the 
portion spent in defending tne counter-
claim. The Court, reiving upon already es-
tablished principles, stated: 
In the case of Szubbs v. Heniwertj1^ this 
Court ruled that the plaintiff was not 
entitled to reimbursement for fees he had 
incurred in defending a counterclaim in a 
foreclosure action. A party is therefore 
entitled only to those fees resulting from 
its principal cause of action for which 
there is a contractual (or statutory) obli-
gation for attorney's fees. 
[13,14] Accordingly, only those billable 
hours attributable to respondent's defense 
of the main causes of action were compen-
sable. In contrast to the situation in the 
Cox case, the trial court in the present case 
had sufficient information before it in the 
billing records to enable it to separate the 
counterclaim hours from those spent in de-
fense of the main causes of action. The 
award of $17,000 was, therefore, derived 
from a sound evidentiary basis, and will not 
be disturbed by this Court on appeal. 
In viewr of the foregoing, the matter of 
attorney fees is remanded for the limited 
purpose of determining, either from the 
billing records or from additional evidence, 
a reasonable and equitable apportionment 
between appellants of liability for the $17,-
000 award. 
STEWART, OAKS, HOWE and DUR-
HAM, J J., concur. 
O E KEYNUMBERSYSUM 
13. Utah, 627 P.2d 62 (1981). 14. Utah, 567 P.2d 16S (1977). 
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home* defendant did not insist on exam-
ining the mother ^nen sne reportec vaginal 
bleeding to aetermme if premature Dirth 
was liKeiy or if so, wnat precautions snoulo 
be taKen to minimize tne iiKelihood of pre 
mature birth defenaan; diagnosed tne in-
fant after birth as having Respirator}' Dis-
tress Syndrome: defendant advised Ivy to 
position the infant m a way which relieved 
the symptoms but would not alleviate the 
condition itself; defendant minimized the 
seriousness of the infant's condition to Ivy 
and Joanne; three of the ten children he 
had delivered who had Respiratory Dis-
tress Syndrome were hospitalized; defen-
dant knew the infant could die from the 
disease and that the disease was progres-
sive; defendant could not himself admit the 
infant into a hospital because he lacked 
malpractice insurance, so would have to 
call another physician or have the infant 
admitted through an emergency room facil-
ity; Ivy testified that defendant only told 
her to watch the infant for changes in his 
temperature, color and respiration, without 
advising her as to the degree of change 
which might indicate a crisis, nor did he 
warn her or Joanne that death could result 
from the disease; and defendant left the 
infant in the care of laypersons. 
There was other, conflicting evidence 
which would indicate that defendant should 
not have been aware that a substantial risk 
existed. However, the existence of con-
flicting evidence, by itself, does not justify 
reversal of a jury verdict. State v. Tol-
man, 775 P.2d 422, 424-25 (Utah CtApp. 
1989). The jury has been through the ar-
duous task of listening to and assessing the 
evidence presented in this most difficult 
case, and I do not think that we should 
appropriately substitute our judgment for 
that of the jury. The jury's conclusion was 
based on what defendant knew or the jury 
believed he knew at the time, and its as-
sessment that given that knowledge he 
should have known the risks. I do not find 
the evidence "sufficiently inconclusive," as 
do my colleagues, to justify conviction. I 
would conclude that the record, while heat-
edly controverted, contains sufficient evi-
dence for the jury to conclude that defen-
dant should have been aware that a sub-
stantia* and unjustified r*sh of aeatr exi^t-
ea ana to convict defendant cf negligent 
homicide as a result 
REGIONAL SALES AGENCY, INC., a 
Utah corporation. Plaintiff, Appellant, 
and Cross-Respondent, 
v. 
Roland W. REICHERT, Defendant, 
Respondent, and Cross-Appellant. 
No. 88024G-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 24, 1989. 
Employer brought action against sales-
man for breach of noncompetition agree-
ment. After denying salesman's motion to 
amend counterclaim, the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake Count}7, Pat B. Brian, J., 
entered judgment on jury verdict awarding 
slightly less than $800 in damages and 
awarded contractual attorney fees in 
amount of $7,500 rather than almost $27,-
000 that had been sought. Parties appeal-
ed. The Court of Appeals, Billings, J., held 
that: (1) salesman bore burden of proving 
that there was no reasonable relationship 
between actual damages suffered by em-
ployer as result of his breach and amount 
employer would collect under agreement's 
liquidated damages provision; (2) liqui-
dated damages provision was not unreason-
able as a matter of law; (3) unexplained 
reduction of attorney fees sought could not 
stand on appeal; and (4) motion to amend 
counterclaim was properly denied. 
Affirmed in part, reversed and re-
manded in part. 
1. Damages @=>163(3) 
In context of noncompetition agree-
ment's liquidated damages provision, sales-
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mar. vno orea^r-ec agreement rvore ry^ r-cei.-
of snowing iha; no carnages were suffered 
or that there was no reasonable relation-
ship between actual damages suffered by 
employer and amount employer would col-
lect under agreement, and burden should 
not have been placed on employer to estab-
lish that provision provided fair compensa-
tion and that damages that would be 
awarded under provision were reasonably 
related to its actual damages. 
2. Damages G=78(3) 
Noncompetition agreement's liquidated 
damages provision, pursuant to which 
salesman would hold commissions earned 
during three years following termination of 
employment in trust if he continued to rep-
resent manufacturers he had previously 
represented on employer's behalf. wras not 
unreasonable as a matter of law even 
though it did not reflect expenses incurred 
by salesmen in earning such commissions. 
3. Costs <s=*l94.32 
Where parties to contract agree that 
attorney fees will be awarded, such attor-
ney fee provision should ordinarily be en-
forced by court. 
4. Costs <3=>194.18, 208 
Award entered under contractual at-
torney fee provision could not stand on 
appeal where it reflected amount considera-
bly less than that established by unrebut-
ted evidence and where there were no find-
ings explaining trial court's reduction. 
5. Appeal and Error <3=>959(1) 
In reviewing grant or denial of motion 
to amend, court will look to timeliness of 
motion, justification given by movant for 
delay, and resulting prejudice nonmovant. 
6. Pleading <s=>262 
Motion to amend counterclaim filed 
three years after commencement of litiga-
tion, following extensive discovery, was 
properly denied despite movant's conten-
tion that issues presented by motion did not 
substantially vary issues and evidence al-
ready involved; issues raised by complaint 
were limited to validity of a contract, while 
counterclaim interjected movant's entitle-
ment to commissions under that contract, 
saitrs figures; moreover n'-.otijr. T-vc: mscr 
day before trial was scnecu.ee. arc m< jus-
tification was offered for ae;ay. Rules Civ. 
Proc. Rule IS'.e1 
Bryce E. Roe. Salt Lake City. for plain-
tiff, appellant and cros=-responde:.: 
E.K. Fankhauser. Sak Lane City, for de-
fendant, respondent anc cross-appeiiant. 
Before BENCH. EILLINGS a:;a 
GREENWOOD, J J. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Regional Sales Agency, Inc. ("Regional") 
appeals from a jury7 verdict awarding it 
$792.18 in damages as a result of cross-ap-
pellant Roland Reichert's ("Mr. Reichert") 
breach of a non-competition agreement 
with Regional, his former employer. Re-
gional also appeals the trial court's reduc-
tion of its attorney fees which Regional 
claims were provided for by the parties' 
written contract and reasonably incurred in 
prosecuting this action. 
Mr. Reichert cross-appeals the court's de-
nial of his attempt to amend his counter-
claim to add a claim for unpaid commis-
sions and salary. We reverse and remand 
in part, and affirm in part. 
Since the late 1950s, Edwrard and Helen 
Kiholm have operated a small family busi-
ness which acted as a manufacturer's rep-
resentative in designated territories of the 
mountain west. The business earned com-
missions from its principal manufacturers 
by selling their goods to retailers. 
in 1977, the Kiholms hired Mr. Reichert 
as an independent contractor to handle out-
side sales. If the relationship was satisfac-
tory, the Kiholms intended to retire in ten 
years with Mr. Reichert taking over the 
business. Mr. Reichert worked for the Ki-
holms until 1978 when the business was 
incorporated as Regional. 
In 1979, Mr. Reichert entered into a writ-
ten employment contract with Regional. 
The employment contract contains a non-
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competition ciause restricting Mr. fleicnert 
from representing manufacturers repre-
sented by Regional or competing with Re-
gional's manufacturers for a three-year pe-
riod after tne termination of his relation-
ship with Regional. The contract also con-
tains the following damage and attorney 
fees provisions central to this appeal 
In the event Agent breaches the provi-
sions of this [non-competition] para-
graph, all proceeds and benefits derived 
therefrom by Agent shall be received and 
held by him in trust for Company, and 
shall be paid to Company upon demand 
by Company. 
Agent further agrees to pay Company its 
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs 
which are incurred as a result of his 
breach of any provision herein. 
On April 30, 1987, the day before a non-
jury trial was scheduled before Judge 
Leonard H. Russon and more than three 
years after Mr. Reichert's original answer 
and counterclaim had been filed, Mr. Reic-
hert filed an amendment to his counter-
claim. In this amendment, Mr. Reichert 
claimed Regional owed him commissions 
and salary from 1977 through 1983. Judge 
Russon struck the amendment. On May 
26, 1987, after Judge Russon had recused 
himself at Mr. Reichert's request, and a 
mistrial had been granted, Mr. Reichert 
filed a written motion to amend his coun-
terclaim again asserting a claim for com-
missions and wages. The motion was de-
nied by Judge Pat B. Brian. 
At trial it was undisputed that after Mr. 
Reichert left Regional in 1983, he continued 
to represent three manufacturers whom he 
had previously represented as a salesman 
for Regional: Artfaire, Carousel Party Fa-
vors, Inc., and Atlas Textiles. He received 
commissions of $42,176.09 from these man-
ufacturers in the three-year period after 
his relationship with Regional ended. 
1. In its brief, Regional complains about several 
issues being submitted to the jury and the 
court's decision not to direct a verdict. Specifi-
cally, Regional claims (1) there was insufficient 
evidence to submit to the jury the question of 
whether the 1979 agreement was intended to 
have legal effect, and (2) the court should have 
In defense of his actions. Mr. R,eichert 
ciaimed tne written agreement of August 
13. 1979. was never intended to nave any 
force or effect. He insisted tnai Kegiona, 
represented that it was merely "window 
dressing" to protect Regional in case of a 
tax audit. 
The jury found the 1979 employment 
agreement was enforceable and neither 
party has appealed this issue.1 However, 
the jury only awarded Regional $792.IS m 
damages. 
The parties stipulated that evidence sup-
porting reasonable attorney fees as provid-
ed for by the employment agreement would 
be submitted to the judge by affidavit fol-
lowing the jury verdict. Counsel for Re-
gional submitted a lengthy affidavit detail-
ing $26,740.50 in fees. No opposing affida-
vit was submitted by Mr. Reichert. The 
court, without giving any explanation, 
awarded Regional $7,500 in fees. 
The issues we address in this appeal are: 
(1) whether Regional should have a new 
trial on the issue of damages; (2) whether 
the judge abused his discretion in reducing 
Regional's attorney fees; and (3) whether 
the trial court erred in denying Mr. Reic-
hert's motion to amend his counterclaim to 
add a claim for unpaid commissions and 
salary. 
I. DAMAGES 
Regional challenges the jury's damage 
award claiming it is contrary to the unam-
biguous terms of the parties' non-competi-
tion agreement which provides a formula to 
calculate damages. Regional claims the 
inadequate damage award is a result of the 
trial court improperly instructing the jury 
on the issue of damages. 
The provisions of the 1979 agreement 
dealing with damages at issue on appeal 
provide: 
directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the 
issue of liability. However, since the jury decid-
ed the issue of enforceability of the contract in 
Regional's favor, we do not consider these argu-
ments. Whatever error may have occurred was 
harmless. 
REGIONAL SALES AGENCY. INC. % REICHERT 
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At no nine during tne term of this 
agreement, or within a period o: tnree 
years following the termination of 
Agent s employment snail Agent [Reic-
hen], for himself or m behalf of any 
other person, firm, partnership or corpo-
ration totner than the Company [Region-
al] ; represent any Principal of company 
for the purpose of selling any of their 
products 
Because a breach of this provision will 
result in irreparable damages which are 
difficult to measure . . . Company at its 
election shall be entitled to an injunction 
restraining Agent from breaching the 
terms of this provision. 
In the event Agent breaches the provi-
sions of this paragraph, all proceeds and 
benefits derived therefrom from agent 
shall be received and held by him in trust 
for company, and shall be paid to compa-
ny upon demand by company. 
In the first instance, the determination of 
whether or not a contract is ambiguous is a 
question of law. Wilbum v. Interstate 
Elec, 748 P.2d 582, 585 (Utah CtApp. 
1988). If the trial court finds the agree-
ment unambiguous and interprets its mean-
ing by examining only the words of the 
agreement, this interpretation also 
presents a question of law. Kimball v. 
Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985). 
We thus "accord [the trial court's] con-
struction no particular weight, reviewing 
its action under a correctness standard." 
Id. The trial court's selection of jury in-
structions interpreting contractual lan-
guage also presents a question of law. 
"Therefore, we grant no particular defer-
ence to the trial court's ruling.,, Ramon v. 
Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1989). 
"Where questions arise in the interpreta-
tion of an agreement, the first source of 
inquiry is within the document itself. It 
should be looked at in its entirety and in 
accordance with its purpose. All of its 
parts should be given effect insofar as that 
is possible." Big Cottonwood Tanner 
Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357, 
1359 (Utah CtApp. 1987); see also Larra-
0£'i V. Royal Dairy RrOCtt. 
Ibo, 163 (Utar. 19* '/ 
f 1, 2] We find tne relevant non-competi-
tion ana liquidated damage provisions un-
ambiguous]} provide mat Mr Reicnert was 
not to represent any pnncipa of Regions s 
for three years following his termination 
Mr. Reicnert aamittec at trial that during 
his tenure with Regional the company rep-
resented Carouse] Products. Atlas Textiles, 
anc Artfaire. tnree of P-egional's former 
principals as defined by the parties con-
tract. The agreement further provides 
that if Mr. Reichert does represent any of 
Regional's principals, then he will hold all 
commissions earned as a result of this pro-
hibited representation in trust for Region-
al. Regional relied on this contractual lan-
guage and introduced evidence that Mr. 
Reichert collected $42,176.09 in commis-
sions from Carousel, Atlas, and Artfaire 
during the three years following his termi-
nation. 
Regional requested the following instruc-
tion reflecting its theory that the contract 
provided a formula for determining dam-
ages based on these earnings in violation of 
the contract: 
Plaintiff is entitled to recover, in addi-
tion to any other damages it may prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence, all 
commissions received by defendant dur-
ing the years 1984, 1985, and 1986 from 
Artfaire, Carousel Party Favors, Inc., 
and Atlas Textiles. 
This instruction was refused by the trial 
court. The court substituted the following 
instruction on damages: 
Where the parties agree on a method 
of establishing damages for breach of 
contract, the agreement is enforceable if 
it is designed to provide fair compensa-
tion for the breach, based upon a reason-
able relation to actual damages. 
Regional claims the instruction given is 
contrary to Utah law. In Young Electric 
Sig?i Co. v. United Standard West, Inc.. 
755 P.2d 162 (Utah 1988), the Utah Su-
preme Court considered a liquidated dam-
age provision in a contract. The court re-
versed the trial court which had required 
the plaintiff to prove actual damages to 
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validate the liquidated damage provision. 
Tne court stated 
[A]s a general rule, parties to a contract 
may agree to liquidated damages m the 
case of a breach, and such agreements 
are enforceaDle if the amount of liqui-
dated damages agreed to is not dispro-
portionate to the possible compensatory 
damages and does not constitute a forfei-
ture or a penalty. Reasonable liquidated 
damages provisions may reduce the cost 
of litigation by obviating the expense 
entailed in proving actual damages. If a 
liquidated damages provision is enforce-
able, a plaintiff need not prove actual 
damages. The burden is on the party 
who would avoid a liquidated damages 
provision to prove that no damages were 
suffered or that there is no reasonable 
relationship between compensatory and 
liquidated damages. 
Id. at 164 (citations omitted); see also Rob-
bins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 
1982). 
The instruction given by the trial court in 
this case, in effect, put the burden on Re-
gional to establish that the liquidated dam-
ages provision of the agreement provided 
fair compensation for Mr. Reichert's 
breach and the resulting damages awarded 
were reasonably related to the actual dam-
ages suffered by Regional. This is con-
trary to Utah law. 
Even if the instruction could be read to 
put the burden on Mr. Reichert to show no 
damages were suffered or there was no 
reasonable relationship between the actual 
damages Regional suffered and the $42,-
176.09 it would collect under the agree-
ment, there was insufficient evidence intro-
duced below to enable the jury to find 
either proposition. Mr. Reichert did not 
establish that the $42,176.09 in commis-
sions awarded under the liquidated damage 
provision would be disproportionate to the 
amount of damage Regional suffered by its 
loss of commissions from three of its for-
mer principals. On appeal, Mr. Reichert 
does not point to any evidence offered be-
2. The only evidence alluded to by Mr. Reichert 
is evidence establishing certain unpaid commis-
sions. This evidence was not admitted on the 
issue of damaces hut was snerifir-allv rpstrirtpd 
low to snow tna: iht liquidated Damages 
provision was unreasonable nor Goes hv 
compare the liauiaateo damages to tne ac-
tual damages suffered DY Regional.1 
We cannot say that a provision wmcr 
returns the commission? lost for a three-
year period as a result cf the breach of i 
non-competition agreement is unreasonable 
as a matter of lav. Aitnougn this liqui-
dated damages formula does not reflect 
expenses incurred by Mr. Reichert in earn-
ing the commissions, it is limited to three 
years. Regional's loss of profits as a re-
sult of its permanent loss of three of its 
principals to Mr. Reichert could certainly 
have exceeded a three-year period and thus 
the liquidated damages provided by applica-
tion of the contractual provision. 
We believe the jury verdict was a result 
of improper instruction and the admission 
of evidence on the issue of commissions 
which Mr. Reichert claimed were owing 
him. This testimony was received over ob-
jection and the trial court limited its appli-
cation to the issue of the enforceability of 
the 1979 agreement. Nevertheless, this ev-
idence undoubtedly further confused the 
jury. This evidence on unpaid commissions 
would be inadmissible on retrial on the 
limited issue of damages under the contrac-
tual damages provision. 
Based upon the foregoing, we reverse 
and remand for a new trial on the issue of 
damages consistent with the legal princi-
ples stated herein. 
II. ATTORNEY FEES 
In Utah, litigants can recover attorney 
fees only if they are authorized by statute 
or provided for by contract. Dixie State 
Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 
1988) (citing Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. 
Mantasf 699 P.2d 730, 734 (Utah 1985); 
Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis 
Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 
1982)); see Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 
(1987). Moreover, "[i]f provided for by 
to the issue of the enforceability of the 1979 
contract, and is legally irrelevant to the dam-
ages provision at issue. 
REGIONAL SALES AGENCY. INC. K REICHERT 
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contract, tne aware of attorney fees is al-
lowed only m accordance witn the terms of 
the contract " Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2c 
at 988 (citing Trcuner v Gushing, 688 P.2d 
856, 858 (Utah 1984})- sec aisu Turtle 
Management. Inc., 645 P.2d at 6"1. L & M 
Corp. v. Loader, 688 P.2d 44b. 450 (Utah 
1984K 
[3] In the present case, the contract of 
the parties proviaes 
Agent [Reichert] . . . agrees to pay Com-
pany [Regional] its reasonable attorney's 
fees and costs which are incurred as a 
result of his breach of any provision 
herein. 
The parties stipulated at trial that, if the 
jury found for Regional on the enforceabili-
ty of the contract, the court would deter-
mine the appropriate award of attorney 
fees. Following trial, counsel for Regional 
submitted an affidavit supporting his fees 
detailed by a computer accounting of the 
hours worked and tasks accomplished on 
RegionaPs behalf. Regional claimed it had 
incurred a total of $26,740.50 in attorney 
fees and costs of $610.46. Counsel for 
Regional also testified that the fees were 
reasonable considering the nature and ex-
tent of the work performed. Mr. Reichert 
made no objection to the affidavit nor did 
he offer opposing testimony on the issue of 
reasonable attorney fees. The court made 
no findings of fact nor conclusions of law 
on the issue of attorney fees but simply 
entered an order awarding $7,500 in fees to 
Regional. 
[4] It is generally within the trial 
court's discretion to determine the reason-
able attorney fees which should be award-
ed and we will not overturn the award 
absent an abuse of discretion. See Dixie 
State Bank, 764 P.2d at 988; Jenkins v. 
Bailey, 676 P.2d 391, 393 (Utah 1984); Tur-
tle Management, Inc., 645 P.2d at 671. 
We "will presume that the discretion of the 
trial court was properly exercised unless 
the record clearly shows the contrary." 
Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 
(Utah 1984) (quoting State ex rel. Road 
Comm'n v. General Oil Co., 22 Utah 2d 
60. 62, 448 P.2d 718, 719 (1968)). See also 
Donohue v. Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc. 74£ P.2d H>C7 106* iLtar. 1^ 87 
However where parties tu a cor*tract agree 
tnat attorney lees win ot awarded, trios 
iinanr 
Crav 
attorney fees provisions snouic or« 
bt enforced by tne court. Cooaoc i. 
ford, 780 p.2a 834 iC t.Ati,.19^ 
An award of attorney fees must be basec 
on evidence m tne recorc which supports 
the aware. See Bange^ie^ t. Pouhon. 6 -^: 
P.2d 100. 103 (Utah 198c > However, a 
trial court is not compel lee to accept tne 
self-serving testimony of a party request-
ing attorney fees even if there is no oppos-
ing testimony. See Beckstrom v. Beck-
strom, 578 P.2d 520, 524 (Utah 1978). A 
court can evaluate the fees requested and 
determine a lesser amount is reasonable 
under the circumstances. See Dixie State 
Bank, 764 P.2d at 989. Several practical 
factors to consider in determining a reason-
able attorney fee are 
the difficulty of the litigation, the effi-
ciency of the attorneys in presenting the 
case, the reasonableness of the number 
of hours spent on the case, the fee cus-
tomarily charged in the locality7 for sim-
ilar services, the amount involved in the 
case and the result attained, and the 
expertise and experience of the attorneys 
involved. 
Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 
(Utah 1985); see also Dixie State Bank, 
764 P.2d at 989. 
We have consistently encouraged trial 
courts to make findings to explain the 
factors which they considered relevant in 
arriving at an attorney fee award. See, 
e.g., Cabrera, 694 P.2d at 624. Findings 
are particularly important when the evi-
dence on attorney fees is in dispute or the 
trial court has reduced the attorney fees 
from those requested and supported by un-
disputed evidence. Id. 
We have recently held that a trial court 
abuses its discretion in awarding less than 
the amount of attorney fees requested 
when there is adequate and uncontroverted 
evidence in the record to support those fees 
unless the court offers an explanation for 
the reduction considering the factors previ-
ously discussed. Sec Martindale v. 
Adams, 111 P.2d 514, 518 (Utah Ct.App. 
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1989); see also Dine State Bank. 764 P.2d 
at 987-91. 
In this case, the trial court substantially 
reduced tfte attorney fee? requested from 
$26,740.50 to $7,500 even though the record 
contained undisputed testimony delineating: 
the services performed and tnat the rate 
and time expended were reasonable and 
necessary The trial court made no find-
ings or explanation for its sua sponte re-
duction. 
Mr. Reichert argues that the court's re-
duction of fees was proper because the 
fees were incurred as a result of Regional's 
unsuccessful attempt to secure an injunc-
tion. Unfortunately, the trial court made 
no such finding. Because the trial court 
gave no explanation for its reduction of 
attorney fees, we reverse the award and 
remand for the trial court to enter the 
amount supported by the undisputed evi-
dence or alternatively to make findings to 
support the reduction consistent with the 
authority cited herein. 
III. DENIAL OF MR. REICHERT'S 
MOTION TO AMEND 
[5] On April 30, 1987, three years after 
commencement of the litigation and follow-
ing extensive discovery, Mr. Reichert filed 
an "Amendment to Counterclaim" seeking 
judgment against Regional for "all commis-
sions, compensation, wages and salary 
found to be due and owing" for the years 
1977 through 1983. A non-jury trial was 
scheduled for the next day. The trial court 
struck the attempted amendment. After 
the trial commenced, Mr. Reichert moved 
to recuse the assigned trial judge. Judge 
Russon declared a mistrial and the case 
was reassigned to Judge Brian who denied 
a subsequent, identical motion to amend 
filed by Mr. Reichert. The propriety of the 
trial court's denial of Mr. Reichert's amend-
ment must be measured against Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a), which 
states: 
A party may amend his pleading once as 
a matter of course any time before a 
responsive pleading is permitted and the 
action has not been placed upon the trial 
calendar . . . otherwise, a party may 
amenc nit pieadmg on»y b\ leave cf 
court or by written consent of tne ao-
verse party anc leave shah be ireel\ 
given when justice so requires 
Tiit decision to allow ar. amendment i* 
discretionary witr, the trial court a? pan <?: 
its auty to manage proceedings beiow T^ * 
win not disturb a trial court s aecis^or ab-
sent an abuse of discretion See Girarc i 
Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983). 
Chadunck v Nielsen. 763 P.2d 817. 820 
(Utah Ct.App.1988); Tripp i. Vaughn, 746 
P.2d 794, 797 (Utah Ct.App.1987). 
In analyzing the grant or denial of a 
motion to amend, Utah courts have focused 
on three factors: the timeliness of the mo-
tion; the justification given by the movant 
for the delay; and the resulting prejudice 
to the responding party. See Tripp, 746 
P.2d at 797. 
[6] Appellate courts have upheld a trial 
court's denial of a motion to amend where 
the amendment is sought late in the course 
of the litigation, where there is no ade-
quate explanation for the delay, and where 
the movant was aware of the facts underly-
ing the proposed amendment long before 
its filing. Imperial Enter., Inc. v. Fire-
man 's Fund Ins., 535 F.2d 287, 293 (5th 
Cir.1976); Girard, 660 P.2d at 248; West-
ley v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 663 P.2d 93, 94 
(Utah 1983). 
Rule 13(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure focuses on the moving party's 
responsibility to articulate reasons for the 
delay: "When a pleader fails to set up a 
counterclaim through oversight, inadvert-
ence, or excusable neglect, or when justice 
requires, he may by leave of court set up 
the counterclaim by amendment." Without 
such justification, 
[t]he amendment of pleadings on the eve 
of trial causes great disruption to the 
legal process and is unfair to an oppo-
nent who has conducted discovery, fully 
prepared the case, and scheduled trial 
time based on the moving party's prior 
pleadings. 
Chadwick, 763 P.2d at 820. 
Courts have also found it important 
when denying a motion to amend that new 
KETCHUM. KONKEL, ET 
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causes of action or issues are added with 
consequent disadvantage to the responding 
party. Girard, 660 P.2d at 248. 
In his brief. Mr. Reichert alleges the trial 
court abused its discretion in refusing to 
aliow his amendment because the issues 
presented did not substantially vary the 
issues and evidence already involved in the 
case. We disagree. The issues raised by 
Regional's complaint were limited to the 
validity of the parties' contract, particular-
ly its non-competition clause and Mr. Reic-
hert's alleged breach of the non-competi-
tion clause. The counterclaim interjected 
the issue of commissions due and paid to 
Mr. Reichert for a six-year period involving 
an analysis and accounting of sales figures 
not previously at issue. 
Mr. Reichert made his first attempt to 
amend his counterclaim on the day before 
the trial was scheduled to commence and 
more than three years after his original 
answer was filed. Mr. Reichert offered no 
justification for his delay in asserting his 
claim for unpaid commissions.3 
Thus, Mr. Reichert, on the eve of trial, 
attempted to insert new issues in the case 
without giving any adequate explanation 
for his delay. We believe this amendment 
would have prejudiced Regional. On the 
facts before us and under the authority 
previously discussed, we find the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
amendment. 
In summary, we reverse and remand on 
the issue of damages and attorney fees, 
but affirm the trial court's denial of Mr. 
Reichert's attempt to amend his counter-
claim. 
BENCH and GREENWOOD, JJ., 
concur. 
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3. Later in the proceedings, Mr. Reichert again 
tried to add his claim for unpaid commissions 
by filing a Motion to Amend his counterclaim. 
This motion, also made without justification, 
violated Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-19 (1989), 
which provides: 
KETCHUM. KONKEL. BARRETT, NICK-
EL & AUSTIN, d/b/a KKBNA Incorpo-
rated, a Utah corporation; Kent W. 
Walker and Michae* V. Lee. a Utah 
partnership, d/b/a The Architectural 
Partnership: Sheldon L. Poliach Cor-
poration, a California corporation: and 
Norbert W. Pieper, A.I.A.. Inc.. a Cali-




MENT COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
et al., Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 890284-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Dec. 1, 1989. 
Architects which held mechanics' liens 
filed actions to foreclose liens. Construc-
tion lender moved for partial summary 
judgment claiming its trust deed had priori-
ty over ail mechanics' liens on property. 
The Fourth District Court, Utah County, 
George E. Ballif, J., ruled in favor of con-
struction lender. Architects appealed. 
The Court of Appeals. Billings, J., held 
that: (1) off-site preliminary architectural 
work did not constitute * 'commencement of 
work" for priority purposes under mechan-
ics' lien statute; (2) postforeclosure pre-
trust deed surveying, staking and soil test-
ing work did not qualify as "commence-
ment of work"; (3) foreclosure on fee prop-
erty extinguished unrecorded liens on prop-
erty including mechanics' liens; however, 
foreclosure did not extinguish liens on 
leased and permit properties; and (4) re-
mand was required on issue of whether 
there was material abandonment of project 
which would have required commencement 
If an application for an order, made to a 
judge of a court in which the action or pro-
ceeding is pending, is refused in whole or in 
part, or is granted conditionally, no subse-
quent application for the same order can be 
made to any other judge .. 
Chapter 
1. Interest. 




15-1-1. Interest rates — Contracted rate — 
Legal rate. 
15-1-1. Interest rates — Contracted rate — Legal rate. 
(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for 
the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is the 
subject of their contract. 
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, 
the legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or 
chose in action shall be 10% per annum. 
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to affect any 
penalty or interest charge that by law applies to delinquent or other taxes or 
to any contract or obligations made before May 14, 1981. 
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 1; C.L. 1907, 
§ 1241; C.L. 1917, § 3320; R.S. 1933, 44-0-1; 
L. 1935, ch. 42, § 1; C. 1943, 44-0-1; L. 1981, 
ch. 73, § 1; 1985, ch. 159, § 6; 1989, ch. 79, 
§ 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
ment, effective April 24, 1989, redesignated 
ANALYSIS 
Damages for breach of contract. 
Determination of damages. 




Damages for breach of contract 
Interest allowed on damages for breach of 
contract under a lease should be governed by 
the statutory interest rate in effect on the date 
former Subsection (2) as Subsection (1) and 
added "that is the subject of their contract" at 
the end of the subsection; designated the first 
and second sentences of former Subsection (1) 
as Subsections (2) and (3); and made stylistic 
changes. 
that the lease was entered into, not the rate in 
effect on the date that the damages occurred. 
SCM Land Co. v. Watkins & Faber, 732 P.2d 
105 (Utah 1986). 
Determination of damages. 
Prejudgment interest is inappropriate if the 
damages cannot be determined with mathe-
matical precision. Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. 
Rollins, Brown & Gunnel, Inc., 784 P.2d 475 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Determining interest rate. 
The statutory legal rate of interest is applied 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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A lecera; court •:- :•,:.: 
interest rate of tnt io: 
Question case, sue:, ai 
Iron: trie C£tc pcyn;er.i if: sue t-c- trie ;u^^:.en: 
date. Davief v. CLsor., 74f P.2d 264 'ir,.^:. Ct 
App. 19^ -7 
Where Juiy 7. 1961. the date defenaar.: 
signed the settlement statement, was tnt aui 
aate, as mat was tne date the benen: wa* cor;- federal Quiet Tn i t Ac; Tr;t court, me-refjre. 
ferred anc it was aisc or, this date that deien-
 shouic appiy feaera, common iaw m *etnn* tne 
dams acknowledged an obligation to pay plain- preyjderneni interest ratt. Amoco Prod. Co. v. 
tiffs for their services in constructing duplexes. United States. 663 ?. Stipp 998 T>. Utar. 
the appropriate rate of interest was 10 percent. 19S7 
Davies v. Oison, 746 P.2d 264 -Utah Ct. App 
1987). Cited m Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works. Inc., 125 Utah Adv. Rep. 45 -Ct. App. 1990;. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Usury A.L.R. — Prejudgment interest awards in 
Implications Of Alternative Mortgage Instru- divorce cases, 62 A.L.R.4th 156. 
ments: The Uncertainty In Calculating Per-
missible Returns, 1986 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1105. 
15-1-4. Interest on judgments. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS equity so requires, the court does not have the 
discretion to lower, stav. or waive interest. 
Discretion of trial court.
 S t r o u d v Stroud, 738 P.2d 649 (Utah Ct. App. Cited. 1987), afTd, 758 P.2d 905 (Utah 1988). 
Discretion of trial court.
 w ' 
A judgment for child support arrearages is a C l t e d m Marchant v. Marchant. /43 P.2d 
judgment under this section. The custodial 199 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Tripp v. Vaughn, 
spouse is entitled to the statutory rate of inter- 747 P.2c 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Gleave v. 
est on the judgment until payment in full. Al- Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 749 P.2d 660 (Ct. App. 
though the trial court may, in its discretion 1988); Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847 (Utah Ct. 
under § 30-3-5, raise the statutory interest if App. 1989). 
CHAPTER 2 
LEGAL CAPACITY OF CHILDREN 
15-2-1. Period of minority. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Balls v. Hackley, 745 P.2d 836 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
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a; v-.Tiicr; mteres: commencfe; 
.i- .^ ur: tinier 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Damages for breach of contract-
Debts overdue. 
Determination of earning power of money 
Eminent domain. 
Installments. 
Pawnbrokers and money lenders. 
School districts. 
Unconscionability. 
Damages for breach of contract. 
Eight percent interest is not allowable on 
damages recovered in action for breach of con-
tract; only 6% (now 10%) is allowable. Salt 
Lake Wet Wash Laundry v. Colorado Animal 
Bv-Products Co., 104 Utah 385, 140 P.2d 344 
(1943). 
Debts overdue. 
In Utah, interest is allowed on debts over-
due, even in absence of statute or contract pro-
viding therefor. Wasatch Mining Co. v. Cres-
cent Mining Co., 7 Utah 8, 24 P. 586 (1890), 
aff d, 151 U.S. 317, 14 S. Ct 348, 38 L. Ed. 177 
(1894). 
Determination of earning power of money. 
This rate cannot be used as a basis of arriv-
ing at the reasonable earning power of money, 
in estimating damages plaintiff is entitled to in 
action for personal injuries. Klinge v. Southern 
Pac. Co., 89 Utah 284, 57 P.2d 367, 105 A.L.R. 
204 (1936). 
Eminent domain. 
A condemnee is entitled to interest at the 
rate of only 6% (now 10%) from the date of an 
order of immediate occupancy to the date of 
judgment. State ex rel. Road Comm. v. 
Danielson, 122 Utah 220, 247 P.2d 900 (1952). 
Installments. 
Defaulting maker on installment note was 
liable for interest on sums in default at rate of 
8% (now 10%), as fixed by this section. Jensen 
v. Lichtenstein, 45 Utah 320, 145 P. 1036 
(1915). 
Pawnbrokers and money lenders. 
So far as § 7-8-3, industrial loans, conflicted 
with this section and chapter it would prevail, 
for the former legislation was a special and 
subsequent act, and repealed "all laws in con-
flict" therewith. People's Fin. & Thrift Co. v. 
Varney, 75 Utah 355, 285 P. 304 (1930). 
School districts. 
School district, where it has received the 
benefit of goods, should pay the legal rate of 
interest from the date it received the benefit of 
its contract. Baker Lumber Co. v. A.A. Clark 
Co., 53 Utah 336, 178 P. 764 (1919). 
Unconscionability. 
Where one loaning money had received the 
full amount of money loaned and interest 
amounting to 15% per annum, the debt was 
held fully paid, and the lender could not re-
cover anything in addition. Carter v. West, 38 
Utah 381, 113 P. 1025 (1910). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 45 Am. Jur. 2d Interest and 
Usury § 63 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 47 C.J.S. Interest § 32. 
A.L.R. — Construction and effect of disclo-
sure statutes requiring one extending credit or 
making loan to give statement showing terms 
as to amounts involved and charges made, 14 
A.L.R.3d 330. 
Validity and construction of provision (esca-
lator clause) in land contract or mortgage that 
rate of interest payable shall increase if legal 
rate is raised, 60 A.L.R.3d 473. 
Compensation for interest prepayment pen-
alty in eminent domain proceedings, 84 
A.L.R.3d 946. 
Key Numbers. — Interest *» 29. 
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4Z-z*-c**. Inherent risks of skiing — irai l board? lis ring 
inherent risks and limitations on liability. 
5k- area operators shall DOST irail boards at one or more promirer,: »:>c3:icri* 
wiinin each ski area which -shall include a list of me inherent r:sK= o: 5r~::r_~. 
and the limitations on liability of sk; area operators, as defined in tins act 
History; L. 1979. ch. 166. $ 4. 
Meaning of fttrus act". — See note follow-
ing same catchiine in notes to > 78-27-51. 
78-27-55. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 78-27-55 (L. 1979, ch. skiing and the statute of limitations on such 
166, § 5), relating to notice requirements in action, was repealed by Laws 1980. ch. 43. § 1. 
case of injury arising from the inherent risks of 
78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action or de-
fense in bad faith. 
In civil actions, where not otherwise provided by statute or agreement, the 
court may award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court 
determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not 
brought or asserted in good faith. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 13, § 1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
"Without merit" and "good faith." that it is appropriate, and as long as there is no 
A frivolous action having no basis in law or intent to hinder, delay, defraud or take advan-
fact is "without merit," but is nevertheless in tage of another. Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 
"good faith" as long as there is an honest belief (Utah 1983), 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Attorney's Fees in Attorneys' fees as recoverable in fraud ac-
Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 553. tion. 44 A.L.R.4th 776. 
Attorney's Fees in Bad Faith, Meritless Ac- Attorneys' fees: obduracy as basis for state-
tions, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 593. court award. 49 A.L.R.4th 825. 
A.L.R. — Construction and application of Award of counsel fees to prevailing party-
state statute or rule subjecting party making Vj&*ed OTV adversary's had faith, obduracv. or 
untrue allegations or denials to payment of
 o t h e r misconduct, 31 A.L.R. Fed. 833. 
costs or attorneys' fees, 68 A.L.R.3d 209. 
78-27-56.5. Attorney's fees — Reciprocal rights to recover 
attorney's fees. 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in 
a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other 
writing executed after April 2*8, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory 
note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover 
attorney's fees. 
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History: C. -35S. ? £-27-.!>£.£. ftTia-.'Vfd by L. 
1986, eh. 79. ? 1. 
7S-27-57. Attorney's fees awarded to state funded agency 
in action against state or subdivision — Forfeii of 
appropriated monies. 
Any agency or organization receiving stale funds which, as a result of its 
suing the state, or political subdivision thereof, receives attorney's fees and 
costs as all or pan of a settlement or award, shall forfeit to the General Fund, 
from its appropriated monies, an amount equal to the attorney's fees received. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 155, § 1. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Attorneys Fees in 
Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 553. 
78-27-58. Service of judicial process by persons other than 
law enforcement officers. 
Persons who are not peace officers, constables, sheriffs, or lawfully ap-
pointed deputies of such officers or authorized state investigators in counties 
of 400,000 persons or more are not entitled to serve any forms of civil or 
criminal process other than complaints, summonses, and subpoenas. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-58, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 173, § 1. 
78-27-59. Immunity for transient shelters. 
(1) As used in this section, "transient shelter" means any person which 
provides shelter, food, clothing, or other products or services without consider-
ation to indigent persons. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), all transient shelters, owners, 
operators, and employees of transient shelters, and persons who contribute 
products or services to transient shelters, are immune from suit for damages 
or injuries arising out of or related to the damaged or injured person's use of 
the products or services provided by the transient shelter. 
(3) This section does not prohibit an action against a person for damages or 
injury intentionally caused by that person or resulting from his gross negli-
gence. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-59, enacted bv L. 
1986, ch. 179, § 1. 
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78-27-50. Financial information privacy — Act inapplica-
ble to certain official investigations. 
Nothing in this act shall apply where an examination of said records is a 
part of an official investigation by any local police, sheriff, city attorney, 
county attorney, the attorney general, the Department of Public Safety, the 
Office of Recovery Services of the Department of Human Services, or the 
Department of Commerce. 
A.L.R. — Cred:: czrc :s?ue-t iia&lLr 
der siate ifiw? i:<r wrcngiV b.Ainz car: 
tion. dishonor, or aisciosurt. li A.L.E 4ir. 
Historv: L. 1979, ch. 166. § 1; 1990, ch. 
133, § 18; 1990, ch. 183, § 57. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment by ch. 133. effective April 23. 1990, sub-
stituted "the Department of Public Safety, the 
Bureau of Recovery Services of the Depart-
ment of Human Services, or the Department of 
Commerce" for "or the state Department of 
'Public Safety, or the Bureau of Recovery Ser-
vices, Department of Social Services." 
A.L.R. — Ski resort's liability for skier's in-
juries resulting from condition of ski run or 
slope, 55 A.L.R.4th 632. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 13, § 1; 1988. ch. 92, 
§ 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective April 25, 1988, inserted the 
Subsection designation (1); deleted "where not 
otherwise provided by statute or agreement" 
The 1990 amendment by ch. 183, effective 
April 23. 1990. substituted "Office of Recovery 
Services. Department of Human Services" for 
"bureau of Recovery Services. Department of 
Social Services." 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
following "civil actions" in Subsection (1); sub-
stituted "shall" for "may" following "the court" 
in Subsection (1); added "except under Subsec-
tion (2)" at the end of Subsection (1) and added 
Subsection (2?. 
78-27-51. Inherent risks of skiing — Public policy. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
78-27-56, Attorney's fees — Award where action or de-
fense in bad faith — Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the 
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except 
under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a 
party under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action 
before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees 




Breacn of covenan* of gooc ia;tr. D* insurer 
Discretion of covin, 
Findings 
Hearing 
Staie of mind 
Cited 
Breach of covenant of good faith by in-
surer. 
Proof of a breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing by an insurer does not 
show the bad faith necessary for an award un-
der this section. Canvon Country Store v. 
Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989). 
Discretion of court. 
It is within the trial court's discretion to de-
termine bad faith under this section. Canyon 
Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 
1989). 
Findings. 
Under this section, a trial court must make 
findings that: (1) the claim or claims were 
"without merit," and (2) the party did not act 
in good faith. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 
768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Legislative Enactments — At-
torney's Fees, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 342. 
Cited in Carr v. Enoch Smith Co., 781 P.2d 
1292 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
A.L.R. — Attorney's liability under state 
law for opposing party's counsel fees, 56 
A.L.R.4th 486. 
mcs C'l. I".- UaZ fi tr iss^e 1: a c: J~; fir^r :^: 
fa;ir. r»u: *r n= ct^irei.or. Iimj-= rr a-Lrci- r. 
attorney fee?. Sur^ecncn -' i> coe^ /,'*£*.e* 
requirr writte: frjcngs- Canyor C -ur.tr 
Store v brace^ 78". P 2c 414 Utar. Ibzr 
Hearing 
This sect)on aoes not reauire a tna* court u 
hold a hearse to aetermme if £ parr* na^ bee-
"stubborn]} litigious" or if an action \*as witn-
oui merit Canyon County Store v Brace>, 751 
P.2d 414 .Utah 1989, 
State of mind. 
The existence of bad faith, which must be 
shown under this section, is a subjective ques-
tion of state of mind. Canvon County Store v. 
Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989). 
Cited in Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101 
(Utah 1987): Hatanaka v. Struhs, 738 P.2d 
1052 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); O'Brien v. Rush, 
744 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 1987): DeBry v 
Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank. 754 P.2d 
60 (Utah 1988): Taylor v. Estate of Taylor. 770 
P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Regional Sales 
Agencv, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989\ 
Note, 'The Negligent Infliction of Emotional 
Distress: A New Cause of Action in Utah,'* 
1989 Utah L. Rev. 571. 
78-27-56.5. Attorney's fees — Reciprocal rights to recover 
attorney's fees. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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